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Abstract
We exploit a unique historical setting to study the long-run effects of forced migration on invest-
ment in education. After World War II, the Polish borders were redrawn, resulting in large-scale
migration. Poles were forced to move from the Kresy territories in the East (taken over by the
USSR) and were resettled mostly to the newly acquired Western Territories, from which Germans
were expelled. We combine historical censuses with newly collected survey data to show that,
while there were no pre-WWII differences in education, Poles with a family history of forced mi-
gration are significantly more educated today. Descendants of forced migrants have on average one
extra year of schooling, driven by a higher propensity to finish secondary or higher education. This
result holds when we restrict ancestral locations to a subsample around the former Kresy border and
include fixed effects for the destination of migrants. As Kresy migrants were of the same ethnicity
and religion as other Poles, we bypass confounding factors of other cases of forced migration. We
show that labor market competition with natives and selection of migrants are also unlikely to drive
our results. Survey evidence suggests that forced migration led to a shift in preferences, away from
material possessions and towards investment in a mobile asset – human capital. The effects persist
over three generations.
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“And so it happened that ... the marshall came: ‘Leave’ — ‘But where should I go?’— ‘To
Poland.’ And I say: ‘I am in Poland.’ And he says: ‘This is not Poland anymore.’ ”1
1 Introduction
Forced migration is a life-changing experience, leaving deep scars in the memory of expellees.
Does the experience affect also subsequent generations? In his bestselling autobiographical novel,
Amos Oz writes “It was always like that with Jewish families: they believed that education was
an investment for the future, the only thing that no one can [...] take away from your children,
even if, God forbid, there’s another war, ... another migration”(p. 172; Oz, 2005). The idea that
forced migration may affect preferences for education has not only been made for Jews, but more
generally; for example, in the academic literature by Brenner and Kiefer (1981): “a group which
had been compelled to emigrate from a country might take the portability of an asset into consid-
eration when making an investment in a new country.” However, this “uprootedness” hypothesis
has proved hard to test. Even for the most prominent case – that of the Jews – Botticini and Eck-
stein (2012) have convincingly challenged the idea that expulsion and discrimination are the main
drivers of their educational lead.2 It is notoriously difficult to convincingly identify the link be-
tween forced migration and investment in education. Forced migrants typically differ from locals
along other socio-economic and cultural characteristics such as ethnicity, language, and religion.
In addition, labor market competition with locals often affects educational choices of migrants.
In this paper, we explore a unique historical setting that allows us to study the effect of forced
migration on human capital investment, absent the typical confounding factors. We study popu-
lation transfers of millions of Poles in the aftermath of WWII when Polish frontiers were moved
westward. Figure 1 illustrates the re-drawing of Poland’s borders. The former eastern Polish ter-
ritories (Kresy) became part of the Soviet Union, while the former German areas – the Western
Territories (WT) – became Polish. The latter had been home to about 8 million Germans before
WWII, who had to resettle, leaving largely empty land and capital stock, with only about one mil-
lion native Poles remaining there. Poles were forced to leave the Kresy territories, and the vast
majority of them resettled in the largely emptied Western Territories. We can thus shed light on
the long-run effects of uprootedness, by comparing the descendants of Poles who were forced to
migrate with all other Poles – of the same ethnicity, language, and religion.
To study the long-run effects of forced migration, we cooperated with the Polish social sur-
1Testimony cited in an exhibition of the Polish History Museum devoted to forced migrants from Kresy. See
Appendix I for detail and sample photographs.
2They argue that Jewish preferences for education are explained by religious motives: Jewish boys were expected
to read the Torah. These preferences trace back to the time of the fall of the second temple in Jerusalem (in 70 CE),
before Jews started to be repeatedly expelled.
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vey ‘Diagnoza’ to include questions about respondents’ ancestors from Kresy in their 2015 wave.
Among the almost 30,000 respondents, more than 11% had ancestors from Kresy. We find that
descendants of forced migrants have significantly higher education today, as compared to all oth-
er Poles. The education advantage of descendants of forced migrants is quantitatively important:
They have on average one extra year of schooling, driven by a higher propensity to finish sec-
ondary or higher education. Importantly, education levels of forced migrants were not higher
before WWII. Figure 2 illustrates the reversal in the education of Poles from Kresy and their de-
scendants: Before WWII, when Poland consisted of the Kresy territories and Central Poland (CP),
Poles in the former had, if anything, lower literacy rates. In contrast, in today’s Poland, people
with ancestors from Kresy have substantially higher rates of secondary education.3 Since Kresy
migrants were forced to leave their homeland, selection is unlikely to confound our results. This
finds further support when we examine the educational advantage of Kresy descendants by birth
cohorts. Figure 3 shows that those forced migrants who had likely finished school by the time
they were expelled from Kresy (i.e., the cohort born before 1930) do not differ from other Poles in
terms of their education. For younger cohorts, we find a significant education advantage for Kresy
descendants, even for those born two generations after their ancestors had been expelled.4
The Diagnoza Survey contains only information about ancestors from Kresy, but not about
other ancestors. To fill this gap, we conducted an additional Ancestry Survey in 2016 in the Western
Territories, where the majority of Kresy migrants were transported after WWII. We collected a
representative sample of about 4,000 respondents, who recalled the detailed location of almost
12,000 ancestors from all over Poland, as well as from Kresy. This dataset allows us to compare
the education levels of the descendants of forced migrants from Kresy, of voluntary migrants from
Central Poland, and of Poles who had already lived in WT before the war (autochthons).5 We
find that descendants of migrants from Kresy are the most educated, followed by descendants of
voluntary migrants. Descendants of autochthons are the least educated group in Poland’s Western
Territories today. These results suggest that forced migration has a stronger long-term impact on
investment in human capital than voluntary migration.
3We use the share of people with a secondary degree in this illustration because it is comparable to literacy rates
in 1921 in terms of its nationwide average. In our empirical analysis, we use years of schooling as the main outcome
variable.
4The results shown in Figure 3 use fixed effects for respondents’ county of residence today. These absorb potential
local differences in the education system and in the labor market environment.
5As discussed in Section 2.2, the Polish administration encouraged people from Central Poland to voluntarily
migrate to the Western Territories. This raises the possibility that part of our ‘control group’ in WT (i.e., people without
Kresy background) were self-selected migrants from Central Poland. This could potentially affect our Ancestry Survey
results, which only uses respondents from WT (while our main results from the Diagnoza Survey – which looks at
Poland overall – would be unaffected). We perform a host of empirical tests and conclude that self-selection among
voluntary migrants is unlikely to affect our conclusions drawn from the Ancestry Survey.
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The detailed ancestor locations reported in our Ancestry Survey also allow us to confirm our
main results in a particularly restrictive border sample analysis. We restrict the sample to people
whose ancestors in 1939 lived within less than 150 kilometers of the Kresy border. At the same
time, we include municipality fixed effects for the location of today’s survey respondents. We find
that among respondents who live in the same town or village today, those whose ancestors lived in
Kresy, a few kilometers to the East of the Kresy border, have significantly higher education today
than those whose ancestors lived in Central Poland, a few kilometers to the West of the Kresy
border. We also show that our results from the Ancestry Survey are unlikely to be driven by selec-
tion of voluntary migrants from Central Poland to Western Territories after WWII. In particular,
if voluntary migrants from CP were negatively selected, this would yield a less educated control
group in WT today, biasing the coefficient on Kresy origin upward. To address this possibility, we
provide several tests. First, we document that literacy in 1921 was, if anything, higher in counties
of origin of voluntary migrants (in CP) as compared to counties of origin of forced migrants (in
Kresy). Second, descendants of voluntary migrants in Western Territories today are slightly more
educated than the residents of the counties of origin of these voluntary migrants in Central Poland.
Third, descendants of native Poles in Western Territories (autochthons) have even lower education
than the offspring of voluntary migrants (but levels similar to natives in Central Poland). These
results are easier to reconcile with positive selection of voluntary migrants from Central Poland.
This implies that, if anything, our results underestimate the education advantage of descendants
of forced migrants from Kresy. Our results hold equally for urban and rural destinations in West-
ern Territories and for rural and urban origin locations of migrants. In addition, the strength of
results does not vary with local features such as soil quality or historical literacy in either origin or
destination counties.
In order to interpret our results, we examine several possible explanations. These include
differential returns to human capital for Kresy migrants, congested labor markets, differential out-
migration, and differential fertility. None of these account for the observed education premium
of the descendants of forced Kresy migrants. Instead, the most likely explanation for our find-
ings is that the loss of physical possessions due to forced migration led to a shift in preferences
towards investing in human capital. We support this interpretation by survey evidence, showing
that descendants of forced migrants value material goods less, while having a stronger aspiration
for education of their children. They also possess fewer physical assets, relative to the number
of physical assets they can afford. Historical narratives from the time of expulsions corroborate
our survey evidence, suggesting a change in preferences towards education. The Western Institute
in Poznan (Instytut Zachodni) collected memoirs written by re-settlers in Western Territories in
the 1950s, some of which were subsequently published and analyzed by historians. For exam-
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ple, the memoir by a forced migrant from Kresy, who came from a simple peasant family, reads:
“In Western Territories, there was a specific situation. People did not attach great importance to
material wealth. After all, nobody had it at that time ... most of the people who came here were
still living in the memories of places of their origin and of material things that had belonged to
their families for generations. In a new life situation, the cult of new values emerged, i.e., values
that are indestructible, that cannot be lost, and that die with the man – the cult of knowledge, of
skills, which can resist cataclysms” (Bieniasz (1987), as cited in Halicka (2015), p. 262). The for-
mer president of Poland (2010-15) Bronisław Komorowski emphasizes in an interview how these
values were passed on in families. “I was born near Wrocław [the former German Breslau], in
the house of grandparents Komorowski who had come there from Vilnius [in Kresy]... At home,
nobody attached any importance to the material side, because everything that was valuable had
been lost” (Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 June 2017).
Our interpretation is consistent with recent evidence pointing to how preferences can adjust
to shocks to environmental or institutional conditions and persist in subsequent generations. A
robust body of evidence has described how individual preferences change in response to exposure
to violence, natural disasters, or economic shocks.6 Recent evidence suggests that these effects
persist in future generations. Zhang (2018) documents systematic differences in preferences for
competition among current Chinese high school students, depending on whether their grandparents
or great-grandparents were exposed to state-imposed gender-egalitarian policies in the 1950s. Go-
ing back many more generations, Galor and Özak (2016) document systematic variations in time
preferences among present-day populations related to changes in agro-climatic conditions during
the Columbian exchange, more than five centuries ago.
Our work is related to a large literature that studies the economic effects of migration. This
research typically focuses on two broad topics: the effect of migrants on short-run and long-run
economic outcomes at their destinations, and socio-economic effects on migrants themselves and
on their descendants.7 This literature studies both voluntary and forced migration.8 Key drivers
6See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a review of the literature on exposure to violence, and Voors, Nillesen,
Verwimp, Bulte, Lensink, and van Soest (2012), Bauer, Cassar, Chytilová, and Henrich (2014), Cassar, Grosjean, and
Whitt (2013), or Jakiela and Ozier (2018) for more recent contributions. On natural disasters, see Cameron and Shah
(2015), Cassar, Healy, and von Kessler (2017), and Hanaoka, Shigeoka, and Watanabe (2018). On economic shocks,
c.f. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014), Fisman, Jakiela, and Kariv (2015), and Malmendier and Nagel (2016).
7See the comprehensive discussions in Borjas (2014), Card and Peri (2016) and Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler
(2016) for short-run effects; for evidence of the long-run effects of migrants at their destinations see Hornung (2014),
Peters (2017), and Murard and Sakalli (2018). Dustmann, Frattini, and Lanzara (2012) provide an overview of the
literature on second-generation immigrants. Katz and Rapoport (2005) build a model that formalizes how forced
migration can lead to a shift away from investing in physical capital toward investing in human capital.
8The literature on the effects of forced migration is surveyed in Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2013). For example, Card
(1990), Borjas and Monras (2017), Bharadwaj, Khwaja, and Mian (2015), and Braun and Mahmoud (2014) use forced
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of forced migration are natural disasters, international wars, and civil wars.9 Finally, a large body
of work has examined the effects of voluntary migration, for instance in the context of the Age of
Mass Migration to the US (Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson, 2014; Sequeira, Nunn, and Qian,
2017).10
Our focus is on the long-term effects of forced migration after WWII, in the generations of chil-
dren, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren of adult expellees. In the context of forced migration
due to WWII, two related papers are Bauer, Braun, and Kvasnicka (2013) and Sarvimäki, Uusitalo,
and Jäntti (2016). Bauer et al. (2013) study the economic integration of Germans expelled from
Poland’s Western Territories into West Germany. They find that migrant children tend to acquire
more education than their native peers. The main mechanism behind this finding is congestion:
Former farming families had to look for work outside agriculture because agricultural land in West
Germany was already held by native Germans. We show below that this mechanism is unlikely
to be at play in the largely emptied Western Territories. Sarvimäki et al. (2016) study the forced
migration of 11% of the Finnish population after the Soviet invasion in 1939. Their focus is on
income of those adults who were expelled themselves, but not on outcomes for later generations.
Relative to the existing literature, we make several contributions. First, we test the prominent
hypothesis, untested by the previous literature, that uprootedness leads to human capital invest-
ment, by exploring a unique historical experiment. We analyze the hitherto unstudied mass pop-
ulation movements in post-WWII Poland, where Poles expelled from Eastern Territories (Kresy)
were resettled into the largely empty ex-German Western Territories. Second, this unique setting
allows us to bypass common confounding factors associated with forced migration, such as differ-
ent ethnicity, language, or religion. Third, our Ancestry Survey allows us to compare descendants
of forced migrants to voluntary migrants who arrive to the same locations at the same time, ruling
out the congestion effects commonly present in migration episodes. Finally, we break new ground
by studying the long-run effects of forced migration on the descendants of migrants over several
generations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides historical background,
migration to identify the effect of migration on economic outcomes at the destination.
9Many papers examine relatively short-run effects of natural disasters. For instance, Sacerdote (2012) looks at the
effects on test scores of students displaced from New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Nakamura, Sigurdsson, and
Steinsson (2017) study the labour market outcomes of families displaced by the eruption of a volcano on an island off
the coast of Iceland in 1973. Jacob (2004) and Chyn (2017) exploit exogenous variation in mobility caused by public
housing demolitions in Chicago. While both papers do not find effects on educational attainment, displaced children
have better labour market outcomes as adults.
10Bazzi, Gaduh, Rothenberg, and Wong (2016) study lottery-driven variation in voluntary migration during peace
times in Indonesia to show that farmers are more productive in destination locations with agroclimatic endowments
similar to where they come from.
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Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 shows the main results using survey data for all of Poland.
Section 5 shows results for Western Territories using data from our own Ancestry Survey. Section
6 examines possible mechanisms, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Historical Background
2.1 The Change of Poland’s Borders
Poland’s Borders before 1945
Poland’s borders have seen several changes over the last 500 years. The Polish Lithuanian Com-
monwealth (PLC) was established in 1569 when the Polish Kingdom and the Grand Douchy of
Lithuania formed a union that lasted for over 200 years. In 1795, Poland lost its statehood as
its territory was split among three European empires: Russia, Prussia, and Austro-Hungary. No
sovereign Polish state existed until 1918; this period of Polish history is known as the ‘Partitions
of Poland.’ At the end of World War I, the independent Polish state was recreated as the Second
Polish Republic (SPR). Poland ceased to exist again as an independent state at the beginning of
WWII, when Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union invaded SPR in September 1939, splitting it
according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Poland’s Borders after 1945
At the end of Word War II, an independent Poland reemerged within new borders that moved
Poland 200 kilometers to the West. These new borders were established in accordance with the
decisions taken during the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences. Poland gained the former
German territories of Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia, called by the communist propaganda
“Recovered territories” and later “Western Territories” (WT). At the same time, Poland lost the
Eastern Borderlands, known as Kresy, located to the east of the Curzon line (more detail below).
The Kresy territory was divided among the Soviet Republics of Lithuania, Belorussia, and Ukraine.
Figure 1 illustrates the change in Polish borders: The shaded pink area depicts the Second Polish
Republic (i.e., Poland between WWI and WWII), whereas the post-WWII borders are shown by a
thick red line.11
Henceforth, we refer to the part of Poland that belonged to the Second Polish Republic before
WWII and continued to be Polish after WWII as ‘Central Poland.’ Thus, the territory of Poland
before WWII was comprised of Central Poland and Kresy, whereas the Polish territory after WWII
is comprised of Central Poland (CP) and WT.
11The Eastern border of the Second Polish Republic was established at the signature of the peace treaty in Riga
which marked the end of the Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1921. The borders of the Second Polish Republic around
Silesia and East Prussia were adjusted as a result of several referenda in 1920-1922. Throughout the analysis and on
the map, we consider the final SPR border as of 1922.
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According to the 1931 Polish Census – the last census of the SPR – the total population of
Poland was 31.7 million people, one third of whom lived in Kresy. Before WWII, according to the
1939 German census, 8.8 million people lived in areas that after WWII became the Polish Western
Territories. Almost 90% of them declared to be ‘German,’ 10% were Poles, and about 1% Jews
(Dziewanowski, 1977).
Arbitrariness of the Kresy border of 1945
The Kresy border (i.e., the post-WWII Eastern border of Poland) was established roughly along
the Curzon line after many discussions between Stalin and the Allies. The Curzon line, in turn,
had been suggested as an armistice line in a note by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon during
the 1920 Polish-Soviet conflict – a suggestion that was then disregarded by both Poland and the
Soviet Union. The 1921 Treaty of Riga instead provided Poland with land that – on average – was
about 250 kilometers eastward of the Curzon line. The Curzon line also did not correspond to the
border between Germany and the Soviet Union according to the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact of 1939. After the military defeat of Poland in September 1939, the Soviet Union annexed
territories that went well west of the Curzon line – as far as Lublin and Warsaw. After recapturing
eastern Poland from Germany in 1944, the Soviets unilaterally declared the new border between
Poland and the Soviet Union approximately along the Curzon line, which the Allies ultimately
conceded at the Yalta conference. Historians of Poland agree that the post-WWII border between
Poland and the USSR, which we henceforth refer to as Kresy border, was arbitrary. For example,
Davies (1981, p. 493) writes: “All decisions regarding the Polish frontiers were taken ad hoc[...]
No attempt to trim the frontiers to the wishes of the population ever succeeded, [...] it was decided
in 1944–5 to trim the population to the requirements of arbitrary frontiers.”
Poles in Kresy and Central Poland before WWII
In the context of our study, a relevant question is whether Poles from Kresy were exposed to
radically different experiences than Poles from other regions already before WWII. In the two
periods when Poland was a sovereign state – PLC in 1569-1795 and SPR in 1918-39 – Poles had
the same rights in all parts of the country. Namely, Poles who lived in what later became Kresy and
Poles who lived in what later became Central Poland had exactly the same status (Davies, 1981).
In contrast, during the Partitions of Poland, the living conditions and the rights of Poles differed
across the three empires (e.g., Davies, 1981; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015). The Russian and
the Austro-Hungarian Partitions stretched over parts of Kresy and parts of Central Poland. Within
these two Partitions, Poles had the same rights irrespective of whether (or not) they lived in Kresy.12
12Below, in Section 6.3, we show that our results hold when we restrict the sample to ancestors who lived within
the former Russian Partition of Poland (which covered about three quarters of the Kresy territory and one-half of
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Overall, Poles in Kresy faced differential discrimination (as compared to Poles in other parts of
Poland) only once – when they were forced to move from Kresy at the end of WWII. We describe
this in the next section.13
2.2 Post-WWII Mass Population Movements
As a result of the change of borders after WWII, mass population movements occurred. At the
end of WWII, an estimated 2.5-3.4 million Germans (who had not fled as the Red Army was
advanced), and 1 million Poles were still located in the Western Territories (Dziewanowski, 1977).
The remaining Germans were expelled from WT and had to resettle in Germany to the west of
the Oder-Neisse line. Importantly, Polish and Soviet authorities had agreed on a mass population
exchange following the change of the borders, according to which Poles from Kresy were forced
to resettle within the new Poland, while Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians had to leave
Poland and resettle in the USSR. These mass movements of people began in 1944 and were largely
completed by 1948 (e.g., Schechtman, 1962; Eberhardt, 2003).
The population exchange agreements were signed between the so-called Polish Committee of
National Liberation – a puppet provisional government of Poland controlled by the Soviet Union –
and the governments of the three Soviet Republics of Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania (Ciesiel-
ski, 1999). The official language of these agreements did not explicitly specify that the ethnic
groups in question were to be expelled from the two respective sides of the Curzon line. Howev-
er, historians agree that the members of these groups had no viable alternative but to move – this
was also driven by the Polish and Soviet authorities seeking to create ‘facts’ quickly, by moving
populations according to the newly created frontiers (c.f. Davies, 1981; Kersten, 1986).
Forced migration from Kresy territories
By 1950, 2.1 million Poles had been forced to move from the Kresy territories. The Polish State
Repatriation Bureau tried to ensure an orderly movement of Poles from Kresy directly to WT.
the territory of Central Poland). The Prussian Partition did not include any part of Kresy, and the Austro-Hungarian
Partition covered about one-quarter of Kresy.
13A related question is whether Poles in Kresy and Central Poland were differentially exposed to ethnic conflict.
During most of the history of PLC, Poles coexisted relatively peacefully with other religious and linguistic groups
that lived in the territory of Poland (Davies, 1981). Occasionally, however, PLC did experience open ethnic conflicts.
The most violent event in PLC broke out during Bogdan Khmelnitsky’s uprising in the middle of the 17th century,
when Ukrainians turned against Poles and Jews. Thereafter, there was no major episode of ethnic violence until
1939, with the notable exception of a series of anti-Jewish pogroms perpetrated by Poles following the death of Polish
leader Józef Piłsudski in 1935 (these pogroms took place mostly in the Southern part of Central Poland). The largest
conflict involving Poles (which was not carried out by the Nazi occupiers) erupted towards the end of WWII. Ukrainian
nationalists had a similar objective as later implemented by Stalin – to purge Poles from Ukraine. In 1943-44, under the
occupation by Nazi Germany, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army perpetrated mass killings of Poles, known as Volhynian
massacres (Snyder, 2003). This was an unprecedented event, which foreshadowed the forced expulsions by Stalin
after WWII.
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However, this was hard to implement because of the war-related devastation, destruction of infras-
tructure, and the lack of adequate transport. Approximately one quarter of Kresy migrants settled
in Central Poland, many of whom had family ties there. The aim of the Polish authorities was to
resettle Kresy deportees in those places in the Western Territories that had soil and climatic condi-
tions most closely resembling the conditions at the origin locations, which in practice meant that
trains brought people to the Western Territories from Kresy along the same latitude. Kresy Poles
had to leave most but not all of their possessions behind. Each family was allowed up to two tons
of luggage.
Even though historians agree that Poles were forced to move from Kresy, not everybody left
during the post-war population exchange.14 Some of the remaining Poles in Kresy left to Poland
during the so-called second repatriation of Poles from the USSR in 1955-1959. In 1945-1946,
authorities in the Lithuanian and Belorussian SSR were concerned that agricultural production
could be halted by a drop in agricultural labor and tried to prevent Poles in rural areas from leaving.
In contrast, Ukrainian authorities did not attempt to prevent rural Poles from leaving due to the high
levels of animosity between Poles and Ukrainians at the end of WWII (e.g., Ciesielski, 1999). In
all three Soviet republics, pressure on the urban Polish population to leave was high. We exploit
the urban vs. rural and Ukraine vs. rest-of-Kresy variation below.
Voluntary migration from Central Poland
Despite war-related destruction, land, housing, infrastructure, and capital stock were abundant af-
ter the expulsion of the German population from WT. Before the war, these territories had been
densely populated. This made the Western Territories an attractive destination for voluntary mi-
grants from Central Poland, who sought a better fortune than in their homeland: Deprivation and
poverty were the main drivers of migration from Central Poland (Zaremba, 2012, p. 97). The
flow of migrants from CP started as early as in the spring of 1945. Some of this early voluntary
migration was spontaneous (mostly from the neighbouring Polish areas, sometimes on foot, or by
horse carts and trucks), some was triggered by an advertising campaign organised by the Polish
authorities that promoted a move to WT in order to populate the newly acquired land as quickly
as possible. The campaign advertised the Western Territories as the land of abundant resources.
Figure A.3 in the appendix presents an example of a poster dating back to this campaign. As a
14The Socialist propaganda tried to suggest that “repatriates” returned voluntarily to their “mother country.” As
Ther (1996, p. 783) points out, the contrary was true. Kresy Poles regarded eastern Poland as their mała ojczyzna
(homeland). “These ‘repatriates’ did not return to their home country but were forcibly relocated to the former
territories of a foreign country.” Ther goes on to explain why the Socialist propaganda was convenient also for
western politics: “One possible explanation for the success of eastern propaganda can perhaps best be described as
‘bad conscience.’ Since Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt had agreed to the expulsion of the eastern Poles
without even consulting the Polish government, the west was prone to accept a rosy version of Polish postwar history.”
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result of this campaign, voluntary migrants came to WT from all over Central Poland, many of
whom traveled long distances by train (Zaremba, 2012).
Aggregate Statistics on Mass Population Movements
The first reliable post-WWII population census in Poland took place in 1950.15 In addition to
statistics normally collected during censuses, it provides information about the mass movements
of the Polish population by asking about the place of residence before September 1, 1939.16 Table
1 reports aggregate statistics from the 1950 census about the origin of the Polish population, sepa-
rately in the Western Territories and in Central Poland. Of the total 24.6 million Polish population
in 1950, 23% (5.6m) lived in WT. Within the Western Territories, about 50% (2.8m) came from
Central Poland, 28% (1.6m) came from Kresy, and 20% (1.1m) were autochthons, i.e., Poles who
had lived in WT when these territories belonged to Germany before the war. The remaining 2.7%
came from other countries, mostly from France. Within Central Poland, 96.5% (18.4m) of the
population had CP origin and only 3% (583 thousand) came from Kresy. Very few of CP’s pop-
ulation came from WT or from abroad (0.1% and 0.3%, respectively). In the Western Territories,
the majority of autochthons were concentrated in a few counties, so that in most location in WT,
inhabitants were voluntary migrants from CP or forced migrants from Kresy.
Importantly, the post-WWII Poland was largely an ethnically and religiously homogeneous
country, composed of ethnic Poles of Roman Catholic faith that differed only in their pre-WWII
region of residence. The Western Territories, as the rest of Poland, were also ethnically and re-
ligiously homogenous: According to the 1950 census, 96% of WT’s population were Poles, i.e.,
Roman Catholics and Polish native speakers. The rest of WT’s population in 1950 were Jews, most
of whom subsequently left (fewer than 300,000 Polish Jews survived WWII, and some had come
to WT right after the war), and Ukrainians, who were forced migrants from CP to WT (during the
so-called “Operation Vistula” – c.f. Snyder, 1999).
The arrival of migrants to the Western Territories
Upon arrival to Western Territories, Poles (irrespective of whether they came from Kresy or Cen-
tral Poland) were allocated capital that expelled Germans had to leave behind. In rural areas,
this primarily meant houses, land plots, and agricultural machines; in urban areas – apartments,
townhouses, shops, and office buildings. Initially, the Polish administration was very weak and op-
15There was another census in 1946. However, this census is widely considered unreliable because population
movements were still ongoing.
16In particular, respondents indicated if they had lived within the post-WWII Polish borders, and if so, in which
region (voivodeship). If in 1939, respondents had lived outside the borders of post-WWII Poland, they had to indicate
the country in which their 1939 place of living was located in 1950. Thus, forced Kresy migrants indicated that they
lived in the USSR before the war.
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erated under conditions of chaos, confusion, and lack of rules. There was no register of available
properties, and people were more or less free to find and claim a place. During this first period,
the capital goods left by Germans were distributed on a first come, first serve basis. “The Polish
settlers were searching houses that were available and not reserved for other Poles... they were
registering them with the local administration and – if there were no counter-arguments – could
settle there” (Halicka, 2015, p. 203). When institutions and the Polish administration became
stronger, authorities began to organize the distribution of land and capital. The arrival of migrants
in WT coincided with the land reform in 1944-48. Migrants to rural areas typically got lots of
8-10 hectares per family; larger estates were parceled out among several families (Davies, 1981,
p. 559). The peasants became owners of their land for an equivalent of a one-year harvest payable
in several installments. Large farms of more than 100 hectares in WT (and more than 50 hectares
in Central Poland) were transformed into State Agricultural Farms. After 1956, de-collectivization
decreased the number of collective farms but they remained important in WT. The houses and flats
left by Germans were nationalized, and settlers got lifetime rental contracts.
Forced Kresy migrants and voluntary migrants from Central Poland arrived to the Western
Territories at the same time. They were treated equally upon arrival because all migrants helped to
achieve the main objective of the Polish authorities – to populate the Western Territories as quickly
as possible (Schechtman, 1962, p. 213). As the deputy minister of Public Administration wrote
to the Central Party Committee in May 1945: “The assessment of the organizational capacity of
the Polish Nation abroad, and the security of our Western borders, will depend upon our capacity
to populate and develop the area in the West” (cited in Halicka, 2015, p. 184). The Ministry of
Recovered Territories collected statistics on the rates of arrival of migrants by month during 1946
and 1947. Figure A.4 in the appendix visualizes these data, showing that the share of migrant
inflows from Kresy was about 40-50% throughout this two-year window. By the end of 1947,
the Kresy migration of the first repatriation wave came to an end. Moreover, some of the Kresy
migrants who first arrived to WT subsequently left (in particular, this was the case for the Polish
Jews who had survived the war).
2.3 Uncertainty Perceived by Kresy Migrants and Education
Historical and journalistic accounts of re-settlements into Western Territories suggest that forced
migrants perceived a higher degree of uncertainty than other settlers or autochthons. The fate of
the Western Territories was viewed as uncertain by its inhabitants because of the lack of a legal
guarantee for the Polish-German border.17 The prominent Polish sociologist Zdzisław Mach de-
17Until 1950, a mere memorandum of the Potsdam Conference guided the demarcation of the border along the
Oder-Neisse line. In 1950, East Germany and socialist Poland signed the first bilateral treaty legalizing the Oder-
Neisse line. In 1970, a similar treaty was signed between West Germany and Poland. The final treaty was signed by
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scribes this in an interview to the leading Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza: “Settlers did not
feel that the land they found was given to them forever. Until the 70s it was not certain that the
Western Territories would remain part of Poland. ...Władysław Gomułka [the first Communist
Party secretary] ...did not invest in the Western Territories because at heart he was not sure what
would happen to them... It is not a random expression that the first generation of re-settlers were
living on suitcases. They never felt sure and secure...” (Gazeta Wyborcza, Dec 29, 2010). How-
ever, the perceived uncertainty differed depending on past experiences: Because of their traumatic
experience of the previous expulsion, settlers from Kresy were particularly worried that Germany
would take over the Western Territories.18 Magdalena Grzebałkowska, a journalist and author of
“1945. War and Peace,” a book based on testimonies of descendants of re-settlers to the Western
Territories, was herself born in WT and had grandparents who were forced to move from Kresy.
In her book, she reflects on her own experiences growing up: “As a child, I was worried that if
something is postgerman, at some point it may become ‘postpolish.’ Unconsciously, I inherited the
fear of my ancestors-settlers that the place where I live is given to us just for a moment” (Grze-
bałkowska, 2015, p.72).19 In an interview with the authors of this paper (conducted on May 9,
2018), Grzebałkowska confirmed that the experience of forced migration had an important effect
on the perception of uncertainty, which in turn is related to education decisions: “Unlike migrants
from Central Poland who always had an option of going back to Central Poland (and some actual-
ly did go back),... forced Kresy migrants got the ‘one-way-ticket’ and lost everything... when you
lost everything, it seems worthwhile investing in yourself, getting more education.”
There were no systematic studies of educational attainment of re-settlers in the Western Territo-
ries by ancestors’ origin before our paper. One important reason is that studies of forced migration
from Kresy were prohibited in socialist Poland. Nevertheless, the scattered evidence that is avail-
able underlines the focus on education – even among the first generation of Kresy migrants. For
example, the sociologist Irena Turnau assembled data on schooling in Wrocław (the former Ger-
man Breslau) in 1948. She found that children of Kresy migrants were over-represented among
secondary school students, and even more so among students in higher education.20
Poland and the unified Germany in 1990, and it was ratified by the Polish Sejm and the German Bundestag in 1991.
18A popular saying illustrates how Kresy migrants perceived the ambiguous status of the Polish borders before the
1970s: “One atomic bomb, and we will again return to Lviv... A second one... we will be back to Vilnius.” (see, e.g.,
Zaremba, 2012).
19“Postgerman” (poniemieckie) is an actual word in Polish, which refers specifically to land and assets in the West-
ern Territories that were taken over by Poles from Germans after WWII.
20In Wrocław overall, 22% of the total population was born in Kresy. Among secondary school students, 27.5%
had roots in Kresy, and among students in higher education, 36.5% came from Kresy (numbers reported in Turnau,
1960, pp. 31-33). These numbers have to be interpreted with caution because they combine different surveys.
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3 Data
We use numerous data sets for modern-day and historical Poland in our analysis. To capture
modern-day educational attainment at the individual level, we use two surveys that also ask ques-
tions about the history of migration of respondents’ ancestors in the aftermath of WWII. We com-
plement these surveys with aggregate (regional and county-level) data from historical censuses
that describe population characteristics in Poland before and after WWII. We describe each of
these data sources in turn.
3.1 Modern-Day Survey Data
Diagnoza Survey
The Diagnoza (‘Social Diagnosis’) survey is a large-scale household survey comparable to similar
surveys in the US (PSID) or the UK (‘Understanding Society’). It is a representative sample of the
Polish population with 8 waves between 2000 and 2015.21 We commissioned the addition of sever-
al questions to the 2015 wave, which inquired whether any of the ancestors of the respondent came
from Kresy and if so, from which exact location.22 The 2015 wave has ca. 30,000 observations and
allows us to compare education and other outcomes for respondents with any ancestors from Kresy
to those without ancestors from Kresy. Our primary interest is investment in human capital. Thus,
we focus on the education of respondents, using years of education as our main variable of interest.
We also use two dummies for educational attainment: i) for having (at least) secondary education
and ii) for (at least) completed higher (tertiary) education. We also use a number of questions about
the attitudes of respondents toward the education of their children and toward the accumulation of
material wealth. In addition, to measure the actual choices in accumulation of physical wealth, we
construct a variable that measures the share of physical assets that respondents chose not to own,
despite the fact that they could afford them.
A drawback of the Diagnoza Survey is that it only includes information on ancestors from
Kresy, but not for ancestors from other areas, such as from Central Poland. Our Ancestry Survey
fills this gap.
21For further detail on the survey see http://diagnoza.com/index-en.html.
22The main question was “Is there anybody in your household who himself or his parents or grandparents were
living before WWII in the Eastern Borderlands (Kresy)?” If the answer was ‘yes,’ respondents were asked to indicate
up to three localities where their relatives lived in Kresy in the summer of 1939. We geocoded these places. What is
missing in Diagnoza is the exact ancestor who lived in these locations (mother, father, grandmother, etc). We collect
this information in our Ancestry Survey (see below).
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Ancestry Survey
In 2016, we conducted our own survey in the Western Territories, which had seen the largest inflow
of Kresy migrants after WWII. We asked a professional survey company to draw a representative
sample of the population in the Western Territories (3,169 respondents), as well as an additional
representative sample of people in WT with Kresy origin (900 respondents).23 Specifically, we
asked detailed questions about the place of living of respondents’ ancestors for each ancestor in
the generation of the youngest adults in 1939. For instance, if the youngest adult generation was
the respondent’s parents, we asked where the mother and the father of the respondent lived on
September 1, 1939. If the generation of the youngest adults in the family in 1939 was the respon-
dent’s grand-parents, we asked about the exact place of residence of each of the four grandparents.
Similarly, if the generation of the youngest adults in 1939 was the respondent’s great-grandparents,
we solicited information about place of living for all eight great-grandparents. Overall, the 4,069
respondents gave information about 13,223 ancestors. The vast majority of respondents knew the
exact name of the locality of origin of their ancestors (and not only the broad region of origin), even
when the generation of youngest adults in the family was the great-grandparents. This highlights
the importance of the mass population movements in the family histories of Poles.24 Overall, we
were able to identify and geo-code the place of residence of 11,928 out of 13,223 ancestors.
We report summary statistics for the Diagnoza Survey and for our Ancestry Survey in Appendix
II, Tables A.1 and A.2. Figure A.5 in the appendix displays the origin of ancestors in our Ancestry
Survey.
3.2 Historical Censuses
Post-WWII Polish Census 1950 – The Polish Census in 1950 contains information on population
movements. It asked in which Polish region or in which country people lived before WWII (ac-
cording to post-WWII borders – thus, people who lived in Kresy in 1939 had to answer ‘USSR’).
In the Western Territories, this information is available by county (powiat) of residence; in Central
Poland, it is available by region (voivodeship) of residence, and for Kresy there is no further detail
(since all of Kresy falls under ‘USSR’).
Inter-War Polish Censuses: 1921 and 1931 – We use two censuses conducted in the Second
23This oversample of 900 additional respondents with Kresy origin was done via ‘random route’ sampling, i.e.,
after interviewers had interviewed one of the randomly drawn 3,169 respondents, they would go from door to door
in the neighbourhood until they found a respondent with Kresy origins. Our regressions use the appropriate sampling
weights to adjust for oversampling.
24In our survey, we were able to monitor the interview process, and we were impressed by how survey respondents
engaged with the questionnaire. Many respondents were fascinated by our questions about their ancestry to the extent
that they made every effort to respond accurately. Many even checked family archives to make sure that they gave the
most precise answer possible. Some even called back to tell us their family stories.
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Polish Republic. The census closest to WWII was conducted in 1931; it gives information on lit-
eracy rates and shares of population with different languages and religions by locality, but without
cross-tabulations of the data. The 1921 Census, in contrast, has literacy rates by religious denomi-
nation, allowing us to measure the literacy rates among Roman Catholics. This is a close proxy for
the literacy of ethnic Poles because in the SPR, only Poles were Roman Catholics; other groups
had other religious affiliations, such as Orthodox Christians, Greek Catholics, and Jews.
Pre-WWI: Russian Empire Census 1897 – The 1897 Census of the Russian Empire (Troynitsky,
1899) provides information on literacy rates in the Russian language and in the native language
for each native language in the empire. For our purposes, we extract the literacy of native Polish
speakers in their native language.
Pre-WWI: German Empire Census 1900 – We use the share of Polish speakers in 1900 across
localities in the Western Territories to proxy for the autochthon population.
3.3 Benchmarking Survey Data against Historical Census Data
While we have no way to confirm the accuracy of ancestors’ location provided by individual re-
spondents, we can benchmark the surveys responses against the information on post-WWII migra-
tion given by the 1950 Polish census. The latter provides both the pre-WWII location (see above)
and the location in 1950; these two pieces of information can be used to construct migration move-
ments in 1939-50. We compare these with population movements implied by the survey responses
– i.e., the difference between respondent location in 2015/16 and the location of origin of their
ancestors in 1939. We find that the ancestry information from the two surveys lines up quite well
with the 1950 Census data – despite the fact that the former includes post-1950 movements, while
the latter does not. Section III in the appendix provides further detail and presents the graphs
summarizing the data comparisons in Figures A.6 and A.7.
4 Empirical Results: Forced Migration from Kresy and Education
Our analysis relates modern-day education outcomes to the place of origin of respondent’s an-
cestors. We use our two individual-level data sets – the Diagnoza Survey and our own Ancestry
Survey. The advantage of Diagnoza is that it covers all of today’s Poland and has a large number
of respondents. The downside is that it only includes information on whether respondents had any
ancestors from Kresy territories, but no indication how many of them and no indication of origin of
ancestors from regions other than Kresy. Our Ancestry Survey fills this gap, by collecting informa-
tion on all ancestors from the generation that was affected by the post-WWII population transfers.
One caveat is that the Ancestry Survey is run only in the Western Territories (where most Kresy
migrants resettled). This potentially raises concerns about selection of voluntary migrants to WT.
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We discuss this in detail in Section 6. Overall, Diagnoza and our Ancestry Survey can be seen as
complements: The former allows us to compare descendants of forced Kresy migrants to all other
Poles, so that selection of the ‘control group’ is not an issue. The latter includes more detailed
information on ancestors by focusing on the area that saw the largest inflow of migrants – Western
Territories. The main results in both surveys are almost identical, suggesting that neither missing
detail on non-Kresy ancestors in Diagnoza, nor selection of voluntary migrants in the Ancestry
Survey, confound our results.
In both surveys, we estimate the following regression at the respondent level i:
Yi = β Kresyi + φ
′ Xi + ηLocality(i) + εi, (1)
where Yi denotes different outcomes of respondent i, such as measures of i’s education and atti-
tudes. In the Diagnoza Survey, Kresyi is a dummy variable that takes on value one if any ancestor
was from Kresy. When using our own Ancestry Survey, we can compute Kresyi as the share of
i’s ancestors from Kresy. Xi is a vector of the respondent’s demographics: gender, age, age2, dum-
mies for six age groups, as well as indicators for whether the respondent lives in a rural area, in an
urban county, and in the Western Territories.25 Finally, ηLocality(i) represents fixed effects for the
locality of respondents’ residence. This controls for the local socio-economic environment, such
as labor market conditions. In particular, we use fixed effects for counties (powiat) or municipal-
ities (gmina). There are 377 counties and 1,726 municipalities in the Diagnoza sample, and 115
counties and 407 municipalities in our Ancestry Survey. Because in Diagnoza several respondents
may come from the same household, we cluster the error term at the household level.
4.1 Diagnoza Survey Results – Education
In this section we present our main results from the Diagnoza Survey. We begin with education as
the outcome variable and then turn to values and material possessions.
Table 2 shows that individuals whose ancestors were expelled from Kresy territories have sig-
nificantly higher levels of education today. Panel A presents our main results for the common
outcome variable ‘years of education.’ In columns 1 and 2 we examine the full sample, with ap-
proximately 25,700 respondents (out of whom almost 3,000 had Kresy ancestors). The results in
column 1 show that Kresy ancestry is associated with 0.97 additional years of schooling, relative
to an average of 11.95 years. When we include county fixed effects in column 2, the coefficient on
Kresy ancestry is almost unchanged (0.93 extra years of schooling). This suggests that our results
25Note that by using six age group dummies together with age and age2, we allow for non-linear effects of age
within age groups. In all regressions that use education as the outcome variable, we exclude respondents who were
still students by the time of the surveys in 2015 and 2016.
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are not affected by spatial sorting of migrants. In what follows, we refer to column 2 (i.e., includ-
ing county fixed effects) as our baseline specification. Next, columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to
respondents in rural and urban areas, respectively. The coefficient on Kresy is somewhat larger in
urban areas (where average educational attainment is also higher). Thus, our results cannot be driv-
en by the availability of agricultural land to forced migrants in urban areas. In addition, the results
are broadly similar for respondents in Central Poland and the Western Territories (columns 5 and
6). In other words, the descendants of forced migrants from Kresy enjoy an educational advantage
everywhere in Poland. Note that all regressions control for county fixed effects. Consequently,
local characteristics such as labor markets or land quality are unlikely to drive our results.
In Panels B and C the dependent variable is an indicator for secondary and higher education,
respectively. In our baseline specifications in column 2, we find that descendants of Kresy mi-
grants are 12.7 percentage points more likely to finish secondary education (relative to a mean of
51%), and 9.9 percentage points more likely to graduate from college (relative to a mean of 21%).
Thus, in relative terms, the association between Kresy origin and education is strongest for higher
education. Table A.3 in the appendix shows that the results from columns 2-6 are almost identical
when using municipality (instead of county) fixed effects. Thus, even when comparing Poles who
live in the same town or city, those with Kresy ancestors have a substantial education advantage.
Kresy Border sample
Could the higher educational attainment by Kresy descendants today be driven by pre-WWII dif-
ferences? For example, culture (and in particular, attitudes towards education) may have been
different in the eastern territories of pre-WWII Poland, even if literacy rates were very similar (see
Figure 2). To shed more light on this possibility, we restrict the sample to an area of less than
150 kilometers on each side of the Kresy-Poland border. This arguably provides a culturally more
homogenous area. At the same time, we face a challenge in constructing this sample. Because
people from Kresy were expelled, there are no Diagnoza respondents living in the eastern part of
the border sample today. We thus use information on the location of ancestors that is provided
in Diagnoza to identify respondents with ancestors within less than 150 kilometers to the east of
the Kresy border.26 As for the area within 150 kilometers to the west of the Kresy border (i.e., in
today’s Poland), we assume that respondents without Kresy ancestors who live there today have
also family roots in the area.
We begin by checking whether there were pre-existing differences in education along the Kresy
border. The left panel of Figure 4 shows that this is not the case: Literacy among Poles (identified
26Whenever a respondent gave the location of more than one Kresy ancestor (see footnote 22), we make a conser-
vative choice – using the maximum distance to the Kresy border among all ancestors.
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by their Roman Catholic religion in the 1921 census) was very similar to the east and west of the
Kresy border. There is also no significant trend in distance on either side of the border. Next,
the right panel of Figure 4 shows that there is a sharp discontinuity at the border, with today’s
education jumping by about one year. This confirms that ancestors from Kresy have substantially
higher education levels, even in a subset of individuals with ancestors from close to the Kresy
border.
Column 7 in Table 2 complements Figure 4, presenting regression results for the border sample.
Note first that in the Kresy border sample, the means of the dependent variables are very similar
to the overall sample means in Diagnoza (column 1). This renders the results directly comparable.
The regressions in column 7 include all our standard controls, as well as a quadratic polynomial
in latitude and longitude to capture unobservables that may vary around the Kresy border (Dell,
2010).27 Turning to the results, we find positive and significant coefficients for Kresy ancestors for
all education measures. Coefficients are even larger than those in the main sample. One reason for
the difference could be that we now use only those Kresy-origin respondents who also remember
the locations where their ancestors lived in 1939. This may be a subsample with particularly vivid
memories of the forced migration experience, augmenting the long-run effects on education.
Note that our Diagnoza border sample analysis has an important shortcoming: Individuals with
Kresy roots now largely live in the Western Territories, far away from the historical Kresy border.
Our border analysis compares them to individuals who still live close to the Kresy border today
(to its west). That is, we compare respondents who potentially live far apart today, although their
ancestors were likely living close to each other. We address this limitation in Section 5, using the
more detailed data from our Ancestry Survey.
Cohort analysis
Table 3 presents our results for different birth cohorts. Column 1 includes only individuals born
before 1930 – the oldest respondents in the Diagnoza Survey. Among this group, respondents with
Kresy ancestors are likely to be Kresy migrants themselves. The pre-1930 cohort was 16 or older
in 1945 and thus would already have finished their secondary education (if they had any). For
years of schooling in this cohort, we find a small negative (and insignificant) coefficient on Kresy
27Following the argument in Gelman and Imbens (2014) that cubic and higher-order polynomials can yield mislead-
ing estimates, we use a second order polynomial. Note that we do not include fixed effects for respondents’ location,
because these would absorb the variation in distance to the west of the Kresy border. This is because we use today’s
location of CP respondents (i.e., those within 150 km to the west of the Kresy border) as a proxy for their ancestors’
place of living. Below, we bypass this issue by using data from our Ancestry Survey, which includes many respon-
dents whose ancestors lived in CP close to the Kresy border, but who themselves live scattered throughout the Western
Territories today.
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ancestry. The same is true for higher education in Panel C.28 Panel B shows a very small and
insignificant positive coefficient on Kresy ancestry for secondary education. In other words, in the
cohort that was old enough to have finished secondary education, the proportion with a secondary
degree is very similar for individuals expelled from Kresy and other Poles. This implies that our
results are unlikely to be driven by pre-existing educational differences or by selection of educated
migrants from Kresy.
Columns 2-8 in Table 3 focus on younger cohorts, i.e., those that had not finished schooling
by 1945 or had not even been born. The coefficient on Kresy ancestry is relatively stable, but
somewhat larger for older cohorts. This, together with the fact that the mean of education is higher
for younger cohorts, suggests that the relative effect of Kresy origin is stronger for older cohorts.
We visualize this in Figure 3, which uses ln(years of education) as dependent variable and therefore
reports the relative coefficient sizes that can be directly compared across cohorts. Among the 1930
birth cohort (i.e., school-age children in 1945), people with Kresy origin have about 14% higher
years of schooling.29 For later birth cohorts, the coefficient size declines continuously. This makes
sense in the context of our hypothesis that forced migration led to a shift in preferences towards
education: The intergenerational transmission of preferences is not one-to-one, even when taking
into account local peer effects and assortative mating of parents (c.f. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and
Sunde, 2012).30
Income and labor market outcomes
In Table 4, we verify that higher education of descendants of Kresy migrants translates into better
labor market outcomes. Column 1 shows that respondents with ancestors from Kresy have about
10% higher incomes. Column 2 suggests that the higher income is at least partially driven by their
higher education – once we control for education, the coefficient on Kresy becomes smaller and
statistically insignificant. Columns 3-4 show that people with Kresy ancestors are more likely to
have white collar occupations; at the same time, they are less likely to be unemployed (columns
5-6). These results remain statistically significant even after we control for education, but the
28One interpretation – if there is any information in these small and insignificant negative coefficients – may be that
young adults who were themselves expelled from Kresy had to organize their lives in their new homes, leaving little
scope to pursue higher education.
29Historical accounts suggests that the supply of schools was well organized as early as 1946, even in the Western
Territories. There was a great effort to ensure good educational opportunities (free and obligatory for the primary
schools). The first schools in WT were established relying on the initiative of individual teachers. Very quickly,
however, the communist authorities created special institutions to help develop a unified educational system in WT
and in CP (Online PWN Encyclopedia, accessed 28 March 2018).
30Note that among the 1990s birth cohort, many respondents were still in school/university by the time of the
Diagnoza Survey in 2015. Since we exclude respondents who were still students in all regressions where education is
the dependent variable, the mean of the education variables is lower in column 8, and the coefficients on Kresy need
to be interpreted with caution.
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coefficients on Kresy origin become smaller in magnitude.
4.2 Diagnoza Survey results – values and ownership of physical assets
What explains the higher education among people with Kresy ancestors? In Table 5, we take a
first pass at the issue by examining values towards education and material possessions. In the first
two columns, we use a question from Diagnoza about respondents’ aspiration for the education of
their children. The outcome variable is an indicator that takes on value one for respondents with
the highest aspiration.31 People with Kresy ancestors score 8.6 percentage points higher, relative
to a mean of 61%. Remarkably, this result holds even after we control for the respondent’s own
education (column 2). In other words, among people with the same years of schooling (who also
live in the same county), those with Kresy ancestors have significantly higher aspiration for the ed-
ucation of their children. We elaborate on this finding by performing a Sobel-Goodman mediation
test. This analysis (not reported in the table) examines the extent to which a mediating variable
(respondents’ own education) carries the influence of an explanatory variable (Kresy ancestors) to
a dependent variable (aspiration for education of children). We find that only 13.7% of the effect of
Kresy ancestry on “high aspiration” are mediated by own education. The remaining 86.3% consti-
tute a “direct effect,” i.e., independent of a respondent’s own education. This finding suggests that
our results are predominantly driven by a change in preferences towards education among people
with Kresy ancestors, as opposed to a mere “educated parents have educated children” mechanism.
In columns 3-6 of Table 5 we examine answers to the question: “What is the main condition
for success in life?” We construct dummies for two categories: “possession of material goods”
and “freedom.”32 Columns 3 and 4 show that respondents with Kresy ancestors are significantly
less likely to believe that material goods determine a successful life. Columns 5 and 6 show
that descendants of Kresy migrants value freedom more than the rest of the Polish population. In
columns 7 and 8, we explore whether the lower value placed on material wealth among descendants
of Kresy migrants translates into actual choices about accumulating assets. Diagnoza asks about
the possession of 20 different assets (e.g., vacation house, ebook, home theatre, boat, etc.). For
those assets not possessed, respondents were asked if this was for financial reasons. The dependent
variable in columns 7-8 is the number of assets not owned for non-financial reasons (i.e., assets
that the household could afford, but chooses not to purchase), divided by the number of all non-
31The survey question was: ‘What level of education would you like your children to attain?’ The answer included
five categories, and we create a dummy for the highest category. Results are robust to using the full categorical variable
instead of the dummy for the highest score. Note that the sample is smaller because this question is not answered when
children have already finished their education.
32For each category, the dummy takes on value one when the respondent answered: “definitely yes,” “yes,” or
“rather yes.” The dummy equals zero for the answers “neither yes nor no,” “rather no,” “no,” and “definitely no.”
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possessed assets.33 Consistent with the results on stated preferences from columns 3 and 4, we
find that Kresy migrants own fewer assets, even if they could afford them. In sum, the results
from Table 5 lend support to the interpretation that forced migration shifted preferences towards
investment in education, and away from material possessions.
5 Ancestry Survey
A drawback of the Diagnoza Survey is that it only provides information on ancestors from Kresy,
but not on ancestors from other areas or autochthons. We now turn to our Ancestry Survey, which
has information on the origin of all ancestors in a respondent’s family tree, for the generation of the
youngest adults at the beginning of WWII. We use this information to compare the descendants of
forced migrants from Kresy with descendants of voluntary migrants from Central Poland, and with
autochthons. We also perform numerous robustness checks of our results. Compared to Diagnoza
(which covered all of Poland), a limitation of the Ancestry Survey is that it only covers respondents
who live in the Western Territories – where most migrants from Kresy were transferred to. This
potentially raises concerns about selection of other people who voluntarily migrated to WT (i.e.,
the ‘control group’ in our regressions). We conduct various analyses to show that such selection
is unlikely to confound our results. Before moving to these checks and the interpretation of our
results in Section 6, we show that our main results also hold in the Ancestry Survey.
5.1 Ancestry Survey Results – Respondent Level
We use the detailed information on ancestor origins in our Ancestry Survey to compute, for each
respondent, the share of ancestors from Kresy (average 23.6% in the representative sample of WT
population), as well as from Central Poland (avg. 60.5%), autochthons from the Western Territories
(avg. 15.9%), and from abroad – other than USSR (avg. 1.3%). We use the share of ancestors from
Kresy as our main explanatory variable in equation (1) and add the shares of autochthons and Poles
who lived abroad in 1939 as controls. Note that the share of ancestors from Central Poland is thus
the reference group. In addition, we also control for the share of each respondent’s ancestors who
came from rural origin locations to capture possible differences between migrants from rural and
urban areas.
Column 1 in Table 6 shows that the share of ancestors from Kresy is associated with signif-
icantly higher levels of education among respondents. This coefficient reflects the magnitude of
changes in education when moving from zero to one in the share of Kresy ancestors. The magni-
33Note that, not surprisingly, Kresy migrants on average own a larger number of assets, as they earn higher incomes
due to their higher levels of education. Controlling for the overall number of assets owned by each household does not
change our results.
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tude is very similar to the results in Table 2, which used a dummy for any ancestor from Kresy.34
The coefficient on Kresy changes very little when we control for the shares of ancestors from other
origin locations (column 2). The negative coefficients on the share of ancestors from WT show
that in the Western Territories (where the Ancestry Survey was conducted) autochthons have lower
education levels as compared to the control group – descendants from Central Poland’s migrants.
Overall, the ranking of respondents in terms of education by the origin of ancestors from highest
to lowest is: Kresy, Central Poland, Western Territories – or forced migrants, voluntary migrants,
non-migrants. In columns 3 and 4, we explore whether the gaps in education levels by origin
are different in rural and urban areas, by splitting the sample into rural and urban destinations of
migrants. We find that the results are remarkably similar for both subsamples, and, if anything,
slightly larger in urban areas, which confirms the Diagnoza results from Table 2. Finally, columns
5 and 6 show that the share of Kresy ancestors is also significantly related to the probability of
finishing secondary and higher education.
While Panel A in Table 6 controls for respondents’ county of residence fixed effects, Panel B
imposes even more restrictions by including municipality (gminy) fixed effects. These are typically
smaller than local labor markets. Coefficients in both panels are very similar, suggesting that local
socio-economic characteristics do not confound our results.
5.2 Ancestry Survey Results – Ancestor Level
In the analysis above, we used our Ancestry Survey at the respondent level. In what follows, we
gain complementary insights by using the data at the ancestor (a) level, where each ancestor a of
each respondent i is a separate observation. We estimate the following equation:
Yi = γKresya(i) + ψ
′Aa(i) + ϕ
′Oa(i) + φ
′Xi + ηLocality(i) + εa(i) , (2)
where Yi is respondent i’s education, as above, and Kresya(i) indicates whether ancestor a of
respondent i came from Kresy. In addition to all standard controls for respondents’ demographics
(Xi) and destination location fixed effects ηLocality(i) , we control for ancestor characteristicsAa(i):
dummies for whether ancestor a is a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent of respondent i.35
Oa(i) denotes characteristics at the origin location of ancestor a, such as whether a came from a
rural area. We also include dummies indicating whether the ancestor was an autochthon or came
34The similarity in coefficients can be explained by the fact that the majority (52.4%) of respondents with any Kresy
ancestor in the representative sample of our Ancestry Survey had all ancestors from Kresy. When using a dummy for
any ancestor from Kresy in the specification of column 1 in Table 6 (i.e., replicating the Diagnoza specification), we
obtain a coefficient of 0.913 (std error 0.106).
35Among all ancestors (who were the youngest adults in 1939 in the respondents’ family history), 23% were the
parents; 55% were the grandparents; and 22% were the great-grandparents.
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from abroad, which leaves origin from Central Poland as the comparison group. We cluster error
terms by respondents to account for the fact that all ancestry information for a given respondent
comes from the same source and education of the respondent does not vary across ancestors.36
Table 7 shows that our results are robust to the estimation at the ancestor level. Odd columns
include county fixed effects; even columns include municipality fixed effects. Irrespective of spec-
ification, we find a positive and significant effect of having an ancestor from Kresy on the various
educational outcomes. As one should expect, the point estimates are somewhat smaller in the
ancestor-level estimation than in the respondent-level estimation (see footnote 36 and Appendix
Section IV for detail).
Border Sample based on Ancestry Survey
Our Ancestry Survey also allows us to perform a particularly restrictive border sample analysis,
complementing the results in Section 4.1. The Ancestry Survey includes many respondents with
ancestors from both sides of the Kresy border (see Figure A.8 in the appendix). This enables us
to compare people who live in the same town or village in WT today, but have ancestors from the
two sides of the Kresy border.
Figure 5 illustrates the border effect for years of education. As in Section 4.1, we restrict
the sample to people with ancestor origin within less than 150 kilometers of the Kresy border.
However, in contrast to the Diagnoza analysis presented above, we use fixed effects for the current
municipality of respondents in addition to our standard controls. The figure confirms and extends
our previous border results: When comparing people who live in the same municipality in the
Western Territories today, those whose ancestors were expelled from just a few kilometers to the
east of the Kresy border have significantly higher education than those whose ancestors lived a few
kilometers to the west of the Kresy border. Table A.4 in the appendix provides the corresponding
regression results, in which we use our three measures of education as dependent variables and
control for a quadratic polynomial of latitude and longitude of ancestor’s locations in addition to
the current residence municipality fixed effects and the standard controls. We also show robustness
to restricting the sample to 100 kilometers around the Kresy border. In all cases, the dummy for
Kresy origin is positive and statistically significant.
36It is important to note that, econometrically, respondent-level and ancestor-level regressions are not equivalent. In
the Appendix Section IV we present the results of Monte Carlo simulations comparing the results of ancestor-level and
respondent-level regressions. First, we show that the point estimate of the parameter of interest in the ancestor-level
regression, γ, is smaller than the point estimate of the parameter of interest in respondent-level regressions, β from
equation (1). The relationship between the two parameters depends on the correlation between indicator variables
for Kresy origin of different ancestors of the same respondent. Second, we show that the level of significance in the
respondent-level and the ancestor-level regressions is similar irrespective of the correlation among ancestor origins
of the same respondent, as long as this correlation is positive (as is the case in our data). In other words, statistical
inference in both types of regressions is the same.
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A limitation of the border analysis in our Ancestry Survey is that migrants from the west of
the Kresy border (i.e., from Central Poland) may have been selected. To address this concern,
the two border analyses from Diagnoza and our Ancestry Survey serve as complements: They
show that the descendants of forced migrants from the east of the Kresy border are more educated
than both ‘stayers’ from the west of the border (Figure 4) and than the descendants of (voluntary)
migrants who left the area to the west of the Kresy border (Figure 5). The magnitude of the Kresy
coefficients is also very similar in both analyses (see Tables 2 and A.4). Thus, in combination,
the two border samples suggest that selection of voluntary migrants is unlikely to confound our
results. Nevertheless, we discuss the possibility of selected voluntary migrants at length in the
next section.
6 What Explains the Higher Education of Descendants of ForcedMigrants?
In this section, we consider several potential explanations for the educational advantage of descen-
dants of forced Kresy migrants. First, we consider the possibility that the Polish Kresy population
was more educated than other Poles before WWII, or that Kresy migrants were selected. Second,
we examine whether selection of voluntary migrants from Central Poland to the Western Terri-
tories may drive our ancestry survey results (the Diagnoza results for Poland overall would be
unaffected by this type of selection). Third, we examine various other possible channels such as
congested labor markets and differential out-migration, fertility, or returns to schooling. None of
these potential mechanisms appear to confound our findings. We conclude that the most likely
mechanism behind our results is that forced migration shifted preferences towards investment in
education.
6.1 Pre-Existing Differences and Selection of Kresy Migrants?
We begin by examining possible pre-existing differences of Kresy migrants, as compared to other
Poles. Such differences could result either from differences in education of Poles from Kresy
before WWII, or from selection of Kresy migrants. We show that both are unlikely.
Were Poles in Kresy territories already more educated before WWII?
An obvious concern is that Poles who were expelled from Kresy may already have been more
educated before WWII. We already presented evidence that makes this unlikely – in our cohort
analysis in Figure 3 and in the border sample in Figure 4 (left panel). Here, we provide an addi-
tional analysis, using data that cover all counties in the Second Polish Republic before WWII (i.e.,
when Kresy still belonged to Poland). We use the literacy rates of Roman Catholics in the 1921
Polish Census. Their Roman Catholic religion distinguished Poles from Ukrainians, Belorussians,
Jews, and other ethnicities living in interwar Poland. As reported in Table A.5 in the appendix, in
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Kresy territories, Roman Catholics had a literacy rate of 58.9%, as compared to 65.4% in Central
Poland. Thus, if anything, Poles from Kresy were less educated on average before they were forced
to migrate, compared to Poles in the rest of the Second Polish Republic. This pattern also holds
when we differentiate between rural and urban areas: In Kresy, urban (rural) literacy was 73.6%
(55.4%), as compared to 74.1% (63.2%) in Central Poland.
Were forced migrants from Kresy selected?
Selection at the origin is highly unlikely among Kresy migrants, as it contradicts the historical
narrative of large-scale efforts to expel Poles from Kresy. However, some historical sources do
suggest that forced migration out of Kresy was not fully homogenous (see Section 2.2). In par-
ticular, the pressure on Poles to leave was lower in rural areas in the Belorussian and Lithuanian
parts of Kresy. In Ukraine, in contrast, rising animosity between Poles and Ukrainians at the end
of WWII led to an (almost) complete exodus of Poles even from rural areas. In what follows, we
explore this variation by restricting the sample to urban areas and to the Ukrainian parts of Kresy.
Our Ancestry Survey allows us to exploit this variation because it provides the detailed location of
origin for each ancestor (both in terms of rural vs. urban origin, and the county of origin).
If selection of Poles from Kresy affects our results, the coefficient on Kresy origin should vary
depending on how much scope for selection a given ancestor’s region of origin offered. Table
8 tests whether this is the case using our main outcome variable – years of education. We cre-
ate different subsamples depending on ancestors’ locations of origin. Regressions are run at the
ancestor level as outlined by equation (2). Column 1 replicates our main result using all Kresy
ancestors: descendants of Kresy migrants have significantly higher education today. In columns
2 and 3 we present results for ancestors from urban and rural origin locations, respectively. The
point estimates are slightly higher for the urban origin sample than for the rural origin sample. In
other words, our results are stronger for locations from which the expulsion of Poles was nearly
universal. One potential concern is that the estimate in the urban origin sample (column 2) could
be inflated if more educated urban migrants from Kresy (see Table A.5) were displaced to rural
areas in WT. If these (former) city dwellers passed on their taste for education, we would compare
their well-educated descendants to the less educated rural population in WT. We address this pos-
sibility in column 4, restricting the sample to those cases in which both ancestors and descendants
are from urban areas. The effect of Kresy is almost unchanged. In column 5, we also report the
results for the subsample of rural origins and destinations. The coefficient on Kresy is smaller (as
one would expect, given the lower average education in rural areas), but it remains significant at
the 10% level.
In columns 6-8 in Table 8 we repeat the above analysis, now restricting the sample to ancestors
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from the Ukrainian part of Kresy, where expulsions were also universal. The coefficient in column
6 (for both urban and rural origin locations) is very similar to the one when using all Kresy regions
(column 1). This suggests that our main results indeed reflect the situation of no selection at the
source. In addition, columns 7 and 8 show a similar pattern as columns 2 and 3: Coefficients are
highly significant for both rural and urban ancestors; and they are somewhat larger in the urban
origin subsample. Overall, we find somewhat larger coefficients in the subsamples where there was
less scope for selection of migrants from Kresy. Thus, it is unlikely that our findings are driven by
selection of Kresy migrants at the origin.
Selection of Kresy migrants into destinations?
Even if selection from origin locations in Kresy is unlikely, there may have been selection of
Kresy migrants or their descendants into destinations. As Table 1 has shown, while the majority
of Kresy migrants settled in the Western Territories, about one quarter moved to Central Poland.
For example, if the most capable Kresy migrants moved to the Western Territories, than our results
within WT would be biased. In addressing this concern, we begin by noting that the results from
Table 2 (columns 5 and 6) show that the coefficients on Kresy ancestry are, if anything, larger in CP
than in WT. This suggests that our Ancestry Survey results within WT tend to underestimate the
effect of forced migration. Next, we present an additional check: We restrict the Diagnoza sample
to respondents with Kresy origin. Within this subsample, we can compare the level of education
of those who live in CP (overall 1,314 respondents) with those who live in the Western Territories
(2,008 respondents). Table A.6 in the appendix shows that respondents with Kresy origin are
somewhat less educated in the Western Territories than in Central Poland.37 This confirms that, if
anything, our results for the Western Territories underestimate the effect of Kresy origin.
6.2 Does Selection of Voluntary Migrants affect the Ancestry Survey Results?
In our results for Poland overall (i.e., using the Diagnoza Survey), selection of the control group
is not an issue – the control group comprises ‘all other Poles.’ However, our Ancestry Survey was
conducted only in the Western Territories, which was not only the destination of forced migrants
from Kresy, but also of voluntary migrants from Central Poland. This raises the potential issue
of selection of voluntary migrants. In particular, our Ancestry Survey coefficients on Kresy origin
would be upward biased if the control group of less educated individuals was more likely to migrate
from CP to WT after WWII. In what follows, we perform several analyses that show that this is
unlikely to confound our findings.
37The reason for this difference is probably migration of highly skilled individuals with Kresy background to urban
centers such as Warsaw and Krakow in Central Poland. Indeed, people with Kresy origin show a particularly high
education advantage in these areas (see Table A.6).
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Regional selection of voluntary migrants from Central Poland to the Western Territories?
We first examine the possibility of regional selection – migrants from Central Poland coming from
areas with historically lower education. For each respondent in our Ancestry Survey, we know the
place of origin of each of their ancestors; and from the historical censuses, we know the literacy
rates at the counties of their origin. This allows us to compare the historical literacy rates in the
counties of origin of migrants from Kresy and from Central Poland. Table 9 presents the results
of regressions at the ancestor level, with secondary education as the contemporaneous measure for
education in odd columns, and with historical literacy in even columns.38 Panel A uses literacy
of Roman Catholics from the 1921 Polish Census that covered all of the Second Polish Repub-
lic; Panel B uses literacy of Poles in the Polish language from the 1897 Russian Empire Census,
covering the Russian partition of Poland, which after 1918 became a part of the SPR.39 Column 1
replicates our main results in the subsamples for which the historical literacy data at the ancestors’
origins are available: We find that in both samples, respondents with Kresy ancestors have sig-
nificantly higher secondary education than respondents with ancestors from Central Poland who
live in the same county today. Column 2 uses historical literacy rates as the dependent variable.
The coefficient on the Kresy dummy in this regression shows the average difference in historical
literacy rates between counties in Kresy and in Central Poland from which respondents’ ances-
tors originated. Because we use county fixed effects, we compare historical literacy rates between
counties of origin of ancestors whose descendants today live in the same counties in the Western
Territories. According to the results in column 2, the average county of origin of Kresy ancestors
had a 3 percentage point lower literacy rate, on average, for both historical measures. Columns 3-6
show that a similar pattern of ‘reversal of education’ holds when we restrict the sample to ancestors
from rural origin locations or to those from urban origins.
Individual selection of voluntary migrants from Central Poland to the Western Territories?
While we have shown that regional (county-level) selection is unlikely to affect our results, indi-
vidual selection of voluntary migrants remains a possibility. In particular, it could potentially be
the case that uneducated Poles from Central Poland decided to seek a better fortune in the Western
Territories, whereas educated Poles from the same origin counties stayed in Central Poland. In
what follows, we show that this type of selection is unlikely to drive our results.
38We use secondary education as the contemporaneous outcome variable because it is the closest to ‘literacy’ among
our various measures for education. Primary education of respondents in our Ancestry Survey is 99.7%, without any
meaningful variation. Also, secondary education has a mean of 0.57, which is comparable to historical literacy rates
(mean 0.62).
39The number of observations in Panel B is lower because the western part of Central Poland was part of the German
Empire, and the southern-most part of Kresy and of Central Poland belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Note
also that neither of these historical censuses cover the Western Territories (which belonged to Germany).
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Negative selection of Central Polish migrants into WT would imply that the control group
in our Ancestry Survey has too low education, biasing the coefficient on Kresy origin upward.
To examine directly whether there was negative individual selection, we would need historical
individual-level data on the education of voluntary migrants and stayers in Central Poland. These
are not available. However, we can check whether the (potential) selection concern matters for our
results: If one were worried about negative selection of migrants from CP, then this would be in the
context of persistent lower education today, so that our control group would have lower education
than one should expect. Building on this argument, we can use contemporaneous education to show
that individual selection is unlikely to affect our results: We show that respondents in WT with
ancestors from Central Poland (i.e., voluntary migrants) are actually slightly more educated than
a reasonable comparison group – today’s respondents in those counties in CP where the voluntary
migrants’ ancestors originated from.
To implement this check, we focus on respondents whose ancestors moved from CP to WT.
From our Ancestry Survey, we know their county of origin in Central Poland. We also know the
education level today in these origin counties from respondents in the Diagnoza Survey.40 Using
the combined information, we construct the following variable for each respondent i:
∆Edu(i) = EduWT (i)− E [EduCPcounty (a(i))] (3)
where EduWT (i) is today’s education of respondent i living in WT, whose ancestors came from
CP. The term EduCPcounty
(
a(i)
)
denotes the average education today in the CP county of origin of
ancestor a of respondent i. E [ · ] is the average education across origin counties of all ancestors
of the respondent i. Since we only look at descendants of migrants from CP, all these counties are
in Central Poland.
Table 10 presents the results for the null hypothesis that ∆Edu(i) = 0 for secondary education
and for higher education.41 Columns 1 and 2 show results for both urban and rural areas. The
positive differences indicate that descendants of CP migrants who now live in WT have on average
slightly higher education than their ‘cousins’ in their ancestors’ origin counties in CP. This result
could be driven by migration from rural areas in CP to cities in WT: Since education is higher in
40We only use Diagnoza respondents in Central Poland without any ancestors from Kresy. Similarly, we restrict the
subsample from our Ancestry Survey to those respondents who have only ancestors from Central Poland.
41The definition of years of education is different across the two surveys. In Diagnoza, this variable is the self-
reported number of years spent in educational institutions. In contrast, in our Ancestry Survey years of education are
imputed using four educational categories. While years of education are comparable for different observations within
each survey, they are not directly comparable between the two data sources. As ∆Edu(i) entails the comparison of
values across the two surveys, we do not use years of education in this analysis.
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urban areas, destinations would tend to show higher education than origin locations.42 To account
for this possibility, we restrict the sample to individuals for whom both origin and destination
locations were urban (columns 3 and 4) or rural (columns 5 and 6). In these cases, the differences
are not statistically significant: For urban destination and origin the difference is small and positive,
whereas for rural origin and destination, it becomes a tightly estimated zero.43 This suggests that
the positive differences shown in columns 1 and 2 are in part driven by rural-to-urban migration.44
Another possible explanation for the positive ∆Edu(i) in columns 1 and 2 is that CP migrants
from rural areas who came to WT cities may have been positively selected. Ultimately, we cannot
differentiate between selection among historical migrants and other potential mechanisms that may
drive the observed (small) educational gap.45 Nevertheless, the results from Table 10 are relevant
for interpreting the coefficient on Kresy origin in our Ancestry Survey regressions. They suggest
that our control group – descendants of migrants from CP who now live in WT – are on average,
if anything, somewhat better educated than their closest comparison groups. Thus, our Ancestry
Survey results tend to underestimate the effect for Kresy origin in the Western Territories.
6.3 Other Potential Channels
Congestion
The previous literature (as discussed in the introduction) showed that migrants who lack access
to local land resources (which are held by entrenched locals) often opt for education in order to
get access to manufacturing jobs. This is unlikely to affect our results for several reasons. First,
the Western Territories were largely empty after WWII, and the idea of the resettlement was to
populate this ‘empty space.’ Second, as we described in Section 2, migrants from Kresy and CP
arrived to WT at the same time (see Figure A.4). Third, if local congestion drove up the incentives
to invest in education, this would be captured by county or municipality fixed effects. Thus, a
differential congestion effect for Kresy and CP migrants is a priori unlikely.
42Note that this concern is specific to the analysis in Table 10, which compares individuals across locations and
therefore does not use location fixed effects. In contrast, all our main results hold with municipality fixed effects,
which absorb (among many others) average differences across urban vs. rural areas.
43Note that, in contrast, our main results hold in the urban-to-urban and rural-to-rural subsamples (see columns 4
and 5 in Table 8).
44In fact, if we restrict the sample to respondents in urban areas of WT with ancestors from rural CP areas, we –
unsurprisingly – obtain significantly positive differences.
45For example, an alternative story is that migrants, even when not forced, revise upward the importance of human
capital. This would be similar to the mechanism for forced migrants, but not as strong – thus placing voluntary
migrants between stayers and forced migrants in terms of their education. Another possible explanation is related to
labor market spillovers in Western Territories from educated descendants of Kresy migrants onto descendants of CP
migrants. This would be consistent with spillovers as documented by Semrad (2015). Note also that, on average,
education in CP and WT today is very similar (see Figure 2). Consequently, it is unlikely that CP migrants merely
benefitted from a generally better education system in WT.
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While local fixed effects in our previous regressions capture any direct effect of congestion
(i.e., the local share of autochthons) on education, it is still possible that congestion affected Kresy
migrants differentially. We test for this channel by using interactions between Kresy ancestry
and the population of autochthons in the respondent’s county of residence. Autochthons were
a minority in WT, but their share varied across localities. We use two alternative measures of
autochthons’ presence in counties in WT: the share of Polish native speakers in 1900 (from the
German 1900 Census) and the share of autochthons in 1950 from the Polish Census.46
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 11 report the results, adding an interaction term between the Kresy
origin of respondents and the county-level autochthon share to specification (1). In addition, we
include fixed effects at the regional instead of county level, so that the direct coefficient on the
county-level share of autochthons is also identified. We use the Diagnoza Survey focusing on
respondents in the Western Territories, with years of education as dependent variable.47 The coef-
ficient on the share of autochthons is positive and significant, both when measured by the share of
Polish speakers in 1900 (column 1) and when using the 1950 Polish Census (column 2). While this
result is compatible with congestion effects on education, it may also reflect other factors, such as
systematic differences of former German counties with higher pre-WWII Polish population. Im-
portantly, we also find that the interaction effect between Kresy origin and the historical presence
of autochthons is relatively small and insignificant. To facilitate the interpretation of coefficient
sizes, we standardized the share of autochthons. Thus, the interaction coefficient of about 0.1 im-
plies that a one standard deviation higher share of autochthons is only associated with 0.1 extra
years of schooling among people with Kresy ancestors – relative to a direct Kresy coefficient of al-
most 0.8. These results suggest that differential congestion effects for Kresy migrants are unlikely
to drive our findings.48
Returns to schooling
Could our results be driven by differential returns to schooling for Kresy migrants? We shed light
on this question in columns 3 and 4 in Table 11. We use log household income as dependent
46The share of autochthons in 1950 in the median county was 6.5% and the mean 15%. For Polish speakers in
1900, the median was 1.4% and the mean 13%. Figure A.9 in the appendix shows that the two measures are highly
correlated. Also, there is ample variation, with some counties having more than 90% autochthons, while others had
close to zero.
47We can run this analysis either using Diagnoza or Ancestry Survey data. We use the former because the sample
size in Diagnoza is bigger – even when the sample is restricted to respondents from WT (where autochthons were
present). Results using the Ancestry Survey are very similar and available upon request.
48Another type of congestion effect could theoretically have affected Kresy migrants if they had systematically
arrived in the Western Territories after migrants from Central Poland. However, this is not consistent with the historical
evidence. As shown in Figure A.4 in the appendix, migrants from CP and from Kresy arrived in parallel throughout
the years after WWII.
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variable and are interested in the interaction term between Kresy origin and years of education. A
significantly positive coefficient would imply higher returns to schooling for Kresy migrants. We
find that the interaction term is small and insignificant in both the full Diagnoza sample and in the
subsample of the Western Territories.49 This suggests that differential returns to schooling do not
affect our results.
Out-migration
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 11 examine whether differential migration from Poland to other countries
(after Poland’s EU accession in 2004) may affect our results. For example, if uneducated people
with Kresy origin (or educated people without Kresy origin) were more likely to leave Poland, then
this could bias the coefficient on Kresy upwards. We use the fact that the Diagnoza Survey asked
respondents whether they “plan to go abroad within the next two years, in order to work?” We
find no relationship between Kresy ancestry and the intent to emigrate (column 5). In addition, the
interaction term between education and Kresy origin is also small and insignificant (column 6). If
the respondents who intend to emigrate have similar characteristics as those who had left already,
these results make it unlikely that education and Kresy origin drove emigration in a fashion that
would confound our results. As we do not observe directly the people who emigrated, we provide
indirect evidence in support of this underlying assumption. The Polish Census in 2011 included a
question: “How many members of your household have emigrated?” The response to this question
is publicly available at the regional level. In Figure A.10 in the appendix we show that there is a
strong positive relationship between the actual out-migration and the intent to emigrate reported in
Diagnoza. This validates our use of the latter as a proxy for emigration from Poland.
Differential fertility
Finally, columns 7 and 8 in Table 11 study the possibility that differential fertility may confound
our results. For example, Kresy migrants may have chosen lower fertility to remain more flexible
in an environment that they perceived as highly volatile. Fewer offspring could then have enabled
higher investment in each child’s human capital. Over time, this may have translated into higher
preferences for education. We find that Kresy origin is uncorrelated with the number of children
per household member, which is the closest proxy for measuring fertility in our data. While this
does not exclude the possibility that differential fertility played a role initially, it makes it unlikely
that this channel is still at play for the younger generations in our data. In addition, note that in
the differential-fertility interpretation, preferences for education would develop later, with lower
fertility being the initial driver. In contrast, the historical evidence discussed in Section 2.3 suggests
49The coefficient on Kresy itself is insignificant because we directly control for the years of education, confirming
the result from Table 4.
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that preferences shifted immediately, as a direct result of uprootedness.
Communities
Another potential confounding factor is that Kresy migrants might be more likely to have moved
in groups from the same location of origin. If moving in groups was beneficial to their descen-
dants’ education, this may have reinforced the education effect we observe. While we do not have
census-type data on the number of migrants in a destination who are from the same origin, our
Ancestry Survey allows us to generate a proxy for migrants moving as whole communities (which
we describe in Appendix Section VI). Using this measure, Table A.7 in the appendix shows that
controlling for whether ancestors moved as a community does not affect our main results.
Recall bias
A potential worry in using survey data about ancestral origin is recall bias. For example, more
educated respondents may have more information on the location of origin of their ancestors. This
is a particularly important issue in the Diagnoza survey, which only asks about Kresy origin. If
education leads to a higher probability of remembering ancestors (and thus, ancestors from Kresy),
then our results would be biased. In the Diagnoza survey, we cannot control for this potential bias.
In contrast, in our Ancestor Survey, recall bias is less of a concern, because it should affect both our
‘treatment group’ of Kresy ancestors as well as the ‘control group’ of ancestors from other areas.
This argument assumes that there is no differential recall bias for people with ancestors from Kresy.
We can use our Ancestry Survey to check this, i.e., whether remembering (any) ancestor locations
is correlated with Kresy origin. We construct, for each respondent, the share of ancestors with
missing information on their location of origin (which is low – only 12% on average). We then
show that i) the share of ancestors with missing information is uncorrelated with Kresy origin, and
ii) controlling for this share does not affect our results. We describe how we built this variable in
Appendix Section VI and present the results in Table A.8.
Possible differences due to the Partition of Poland before 1918
Another factor that potentially could confound our results is the difference in the way imperial
powers treated Poles during the Partitions of Poland before 1918 (see Section 2.1). To address
this, we use the historical fact that within the Partitions, Poles were treated equally no matter if
they lived in (the later) Kresy or Central Polish territories. In Panel B of Table 9, we restrict the
sample to respondents with ancestors who came from the Russian Partition, which covered about
three quarters of Kresy and one half of Central Poland. Odd columns show that descendants of
forced migrants from the Kresy area in the Russian Partition are more educated than descendants
of (voluntary) migrants from the Central Polish parts of the Russian Partition. At the same time,
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even columns show that literacy rates among Poles in 1897 were actually lower in the Kresy part
of the Russian Partition. Thus, the ‘reversal of education’ for people with roots in Kresy holds
even within the Russian Partition.
6.4 Heterogeneity of Results with Respect to Origin Locations
To what extent do characteristics of migrants’ origin locations affect the relationship between edu-
cation and Kresy origin? To analyze this, we use our Ancestry Survey and enrich specification (2)
by adding interaction terms between the Kresy origin dummy and characteristics of the location
of origin. Specifically, using the 1931 Polish Census, we interact Kresy origin with the share of
Roman Catholics, the shares of native Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian speakers, the literacy rate,
and the urbanization rate. We also use the share of literate Roman Catholics from the Polish Cen-
sus of 1921. Going beyond the population characteristics, we look at climate variables at the place
of origin. A large share of the population was working in agriculture pre-1939. Thus, land suit-
ability, temperature, the precipitation-evatranspiration ratio, and ruggedness were key features of
the economic environment. Tables A.9 and A.10 in the appendix show that none of the interaction
terms with Kresy origin is statistically significant. In addition, the interaction coefficients (based
on standardized variables) are typically an order of magnitude smaller than the coefficient on Kresy
origin. We interpret this as evidence that the effect of uprootedness is driven by forced migration
itself, and not by specific circumstances at the place of origin.50
6.5 Interpretation of Results
Summing up, we have performed numerous checks whose results speak against selection as a driv-
er of our results and against alternative explanations such as differential returns on education and
congestion of local labor markets. One explanation that is compatible with all our findings is the
prominent – yet debated – argument that forced migration causes a shift in preferences towards in-
vestment in mobile assets, and especially in human capital. The population movements in Poland
after WWII provide a unique setting to test this – notoriously hard-to-isolate – mechanism. Our
results suggest that, indeed, forced migration caused an increase in educational investment among
the affected Poles and their descendants, relative to all other Poles. Further, our findings in Ta-
ble 5 suggest that this education premium is driven by a shift in preferences away from material
possessions and towards education.
50Among the interaction results, the following is worthwhile highlighting: Columns 2-4 of Table A.9 show that our
main result is not affected by the share of Poles, Ukrainians, or Russians at the ancestors’ origin locations. Moreover,
the interaction between Kresy and each of these shares is small, negative, and insignificant. This suggests that a
possible pre-existing animosity between Poles and other ethnicities does not drive our results.
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7 Conclusion
Forced migration is an important issue in both historical and modern times. The UNHCR estimates
that more than 65 million people are currently displaced from their home regions as a result of
interstate wars, civil wars, and natural disasters. While the immediate experience of expulsion is
dramatic, the long-run effects on the displaced and their descendants are less clear. Such long-term
effects of forced migration are difficult to distinguish from confounding factors. We collected novel
individual-level data to study the long-run education effects of post-WWII population movements
of Poles expelled from the Eastern Borderlands of Poland (‘Kresy’) that were taken over by the
Soviet Union. We find that the children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren of forced Kresy
migrants have significantly higher average education levels than all other Poles. This result holds
in border samples around the former Kresy border and is robust to a host of controls. We also show
that descendants of forced migrants value the education of their children more, and assign a lower
importance to material possessions. We examine several possible interpretations of these results
and conclude that the most likely is that uprootedness shifted forced migrants’ preferences away
from investment in physical assets and toward investment in portable human capital.
The observed emphasis on education offers a glimmer of hope for descendants of those who
experience expulsion. In view of large refugee flows in many parts of the world, a policy recom-
mendation that emerges from our study is that governments in countries receiving forced migrants
would be well advised to foster access to education to forced migrants and their children. While
the international aid community does consider education as an important factor contributing to the
reduction of economic and social marginalization of refugees (G20, 2017; UNICEF, 2017), our
results show that the returns to providing schooling for forced migrants may be even higher – and
more persistent – than previously thought.
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Figure 1: Map of Poland’s Territorial Change after WWII
Note: The figure illustrates the re-drawing of Poland’s borders after WWII. The former eastern Polish territories
(Kresy) became part of the Soviet Union, while the former German areas in the West and North (Western Territories)
became Polish. Poles from Kresy were forced to leave – the vast majority was resettled to the emptied Western
Territories.
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Figure 2: Overview of Historical and Contemporaneous Patterns in Education
Note: The figure shows the reversal in education for forced migrants and their descendants: People at the origin
location of forced migrants (Kresy) had lower education before WWII, while descendants of forced Kresy migrants
today have higher educational attainment. The data are from the 1921 Polish Census and the 2015 Diagnoza Survey.
For 1921, the figure displays literacy rates of Roman Catholics (i.e., ethnic Poles) in the whole of the Second Polish
Republic, which consisted of Kresy (Eastern Borderlands) and Central Poland (CP). Literacy rates were lower in Kresy
than in CP. For today’s Poland, the figure shows the secondary school attainment rate on average, for people without
Kresy ancestors (25,972 respondents), and for people with Kresy ancestors (3,318 respondents).
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Figure 3: Ancestors from Kresy and Eduction, by Birth Cohort
Note: The figure visualizes the results of regressing ln(years of education) on Kresy ancestry for different birth cohorts.
The underlying regressions include our standard controls (see note to Table 2) and respondent county fixed effects.
Each bar corresponds to the coefficient on ‘Ancestor from Kresy.’ The pre-1930 birth cohort was at least 16 years old
at the end of WWII and was above schooling age at the time of forced migration. The regressions are run using the
Diagnoza sample for 2015 (see Table 3 for similar regressions). Respondents who were still students by the time of
the survey in 2015 are excluded.
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Figure 4: Border Sample around the Kresy-Poland Border
Note: The figure uses only respondents (from the 2015 Diagnoza Survey) with roots in the area of less than 150
km around the Kresy-Poland border. The left panel shows that there is no difference in literacy in 1921 around the
Kresy border. The right panel tracks individuals with roots near the Kresy border by including i) individuals from
the Diagnoza Survey with ancestors from Kresy who lived within less than 150 km to the east of the border, and
ii) individuals without Kresy ancestors who live (today) within less than 150 km to the west of the border. Dots
correspond to data aggregated into 8 km (5 miles) bins for visualization, while the lines are based on all underlying
observations, with the shaded area representing 90% confidence intervals.
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Figure 5: Kresy Border Sample: Ancestry Survey
Note: The figure uses respondents from our Ancestry Survey, i.e., individuals who live in the Western Territories today.
Among these, we restrict the sample to people with ancestor roots in the area of less than 150 km around the Kresy-
Poland border. Underlying the figure is an ancestor-level regression, as in specification (2), of years of education on
our standard controls (see note to Table 6) and on respondents’ municipality fixed effects. Dots correspond to residuals
from this regression (aggregated into 8 km (5 miles) bins for visualization), while the lines are based on all underlying
observations, with the shaded area representing 90% confidence intervals. The corresponding regression results are
presented in Table A.4 in the appendix.
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TABLES
Table 1: Overview: Population Census in 1950 (in thousands)
Western Territories Central Poland Share of
(WT) (CP) Western Territories
Total population, 1950 5,602 19,012 22.8%
By Region of Origin:
Lived in Central Poland in 1939 2,785 18,355 13.2%
(49.7%) (96.5%)
Lived in USSR (Kresy) in 1939 1,554 583 72.7%
(27.7%) (3.1%)
Lived in Western Territories in 1939 1,112 19 98.3%
(19.9%) (0.1%)
Lived abroad (not USSR) in 1939 152 53 74.0%
(2.7%) (0.3%)
Notes: The table shows the population of Poland in 1950 by area of residence, as well as origin. Data are from the
1950 Polish census. The three major areas are Kresy (which became part of the Soviet Union after WWII), Central
Poland (which had been and remained Polish), and Western Territories (which had been German and became Polish).
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Table 2: Forced Migration from Kresy and Education
Dependent variable: Individual-Level education, as indicated in each panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample: All All Rural Urban Central Western Kresy Border
(no FE) Poland Territories Sample†
Panel A. Dep. Var.: Years of education
Ancestor from Kresy 0.973∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 1.386∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.078) (0.127) (0.099) (0.118) (0.104) (0.305)
Mean Dep. Var. 11.95 11.95 11.12 12.78 11.98 11.87 11.72
Observations 25,719 25,719 12,816 12,903 19,255 6,464 5,446
Panel B. Dep. Var.: Secondary education dummy
Ancestor from Kresy 0.139∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.047)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.51 0.51 0.38 0.64 0.51 0.51 0.49
Observations 25,720 25,720 12,819 12,901 19,249 6,471 5,440
Panel C. Dep. Var.: Higher education dummy
Ancestor from Kresy 0.102∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.039)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.30 0.21 0.21 0.20
Observations 25,720 25,720 12,819 12,901 19,249 6,471 5,440
Respondent county FE X X X X X
Controls‡ X X X X X X X
Notes: The table shows that individuals whose ancestors were expelled from the Kresy territories have significantly
higher levels of education today. Regressions are run at the respondent level using data from the 2015 Diagnoza
Survey; standard errors are clustered at the household level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
† Column 7 uses only respondents with roots in the area of less than 150 km around the Kresy-Poland border. These
include i) individuals from the Diagnoza Survey with ancestors from Kresy who lived within less than 150 km to
the east of the border, and ii) individuals without Kresy ancestors who live (today) within 150 km to the west of the
border.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for Western
Territories, rural places and urban counties. Column 7 also includes a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude.
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Table 3: Kresy Ancestors and Education – Across Cohorts
Dependent variable: Individual-level education, as indicated in each panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Birth Decade: pre-1930 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Age in 1945: 16+ 6-15 <5 - - - - -
Age in 2015: 86+ 76-85 66-75 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 16-25
Panel A: Dep. Var.: Years of education
Ancestor from Kresy -0.669 1.311∗∗∗ 0.950∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗
(0.840) (0.277) (0.179) (0.154) (0.172) (0.185) (0.197) (0.179)
Mean Dep. Var. 7.60 9.44 10.49 11.58 12.27 13.06 13.91 12.61
R-squared 0.66 0.44 0.31 0.24 0.23 0.30 0.27 0.45
Observations 516 2,075 3,347 5,391 4,418 4,129 3,771 2,016
Panel B: Dep. Var.: Secondary education dummy
Ancestor from Kresy 0.025 0.165∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.035) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.041)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.20 0.35 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.58 0.75 0.62
R-squared 0.58 0.42 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.38
Observations 520 2,078 3,348 5,388 4,419 4,127 3,774 2,018
Panel C: Dep. Var.: Higher education dummy
Ancestor from Kresy -0.059 0.108∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.073∗∗
(0.076) (0.032) (0.026) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.031) (0.035)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.29 0.42 0.15
R-squared 0.52 0.27 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.35
Observations 520 2,078 3,348 5,388 4,419 4,127 3,774 2,018
Respondent county FE X X X X X X X X
Controls‡ X X X X X X X X
Notes: The table shows that the results from Table 2 hold across different age cohorts. Regressions are run at the
respondent level using data from the 2015 Diagnoza Survey; standard errors are clustered at the household level. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for Western
Territories, rural places and urban counties.
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Table 4: Labor Market Outcomes
Dep. var.: Individual labor market outcomes, as indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: ln(HH income) White Collar Job Unemployed
Ancestor from Kresy 0.098∗∗ 0.051 0.103∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.014∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.014) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008)
ln(years of education) 0.790∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.028) (0.011)
Controls‡ X X X X X X
County FE X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 8.47 8.46 0.46 0.46 0.08 0.09
R-squared 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.40 0.06 0.07
Observations 17,763 15,922 13,474 13,462 18,347 16,453
Notes: The table shows that descendants of Kresy migrants have more favorable labor market outcomes. Regressions
are run at the respondent level using data from the 2015 Diagnoza Survey; standard errors are clustered at the household
level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for Western
Territories, rural places and urban counties.
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Table 5: Attitudes towards Education and Material Possessions
Dependent variable: Individual-level outcomes, as indicated in table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High aspiration for edu- Main condition for success in life? % Assets not owned
cation of own children# Material goods Freedom for non-financial reasons†
Ancestor from Kresy 0.086∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
ln(years of education) 0.495∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.008 0.108∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.015) (0.006) (0.007)
Controls‡ X X X X X X X X
County FE X X X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.05 0.05 0.62 0.62
R-squared 0.24 0.27 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.20
Observations 4,747 4,747 22,049 22,049 21,586 21,586 29,018 29,018
Notes: The table shows that descendants of Kresy migrants have stronger preferences for the education of their chil-
dren, value material goods less, value freedom more, and chose to own fewer assets (even if they could afford them).
Regressions are run at the respondent level using data from the 2015 Diagnoza Survey; standard errors are clustered
at the household level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for Western Ter-
ritories, rural places and urban counties.
# Diagnoza asks respondents to rank their aspiration for education of their children on a scale from 1 to 5. The de-
pendent variable is an indicator for the highest category. Note that the sample is smaller because this question is not
answered when children have already finished their education.
† Diagnoza asks about the possession of 20 different assets (e.g., vacation house, ebook, home theatre, boat). For those
assets not possessed, respondents are asked if this is for financial reasons. The dependent variable in columns 7-8 is
the number assets not owned for non-financial reasons, divided by the number of all non-possessed assets.
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Table 6: Results from the Ancestry Survey: Education in the Western Territories
Dependent variable: as indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: Years of Education Secondary Higher
Notes on sample: rural urban
Panel A: Respondent County Fixed Effects
Share of Ancestors, Kresy 1.013∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.139) (0.245) (0.170) (0.021) (0.018)
Share of Ancestors, WT -1.027∗∗∗ -0.542 -1.310∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.332) (0.253) (0.032) (0.024)
Share of Ancestors, abroad -1.161 -3.615∗∗ -0.224 -0.017 0.000
(0.855) (1.500) (0.929) (0.112) (0.099)
Share of Ancestors, rural -0.469∗∗∗ -0.462 -0.532∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.035∗
(0.164) (0.368) (0.183) (0.024) (0.020)
Controls‡ X X X X X X
County FE X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.42 12.44 11.38 12.96 0.47 0.22
R2 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.28 0.20 0.21
Observations 3,636 3,588 1,084 2,504 3,588 3,588
Panel B: Respondent Municipality Fixed Effects
Share of Ancestors, Kresy 0.938∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.147) (0.257) (0.180) (0.023) (0.019)
Share of Ancestors, WT -0.989∗∗∗ -0.907∗∗∗ -1.107∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.349) (0.261) (0.034) (0.026)
Share of Ancestors, abroad -0.623 -2.856∗∗ 0.294 0.056 0.031
(0.659) (1.348) (0.738) (0.095) (0.100)
Share of Ancestors, rural -0.553∗∗∗ -0.342 -0.581∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗
(0.161) (0.337) (0.188) (0.025) (0.021)
Controls‡ X X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.42 12.44 11.38 12.96 0.47 0.22
R2 0.38 0.39 0.47 0.34 0.30 0.29
Observations 3,636 3,588 1,084 2,504 3,588 3,588
Notes: The table uses data from our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the Western Territories, showing that the share of
ancestors from Kresy in a respondent’s family tree is associated with higher levels of education. Regressions are run
at the respondent level; robust standard errors indicated in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Excluded
category is ancestors from Central Poland. Average origin of ancestors: 48.9% from Central Poland, 36.7% from
Kresy, 13.1% from the Western Territories (autochthons), 2.2% from abroad.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for respondents
living in rural places and urban counties. Excluded category is ancestors from Central Poland.
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Table 7: Ancestry Survey Regressions for Education Outcomes – Ancestor-Level
Dependent variable: as indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Years of Education Secondary education Higher education
Ancestor from Kresy 0.503∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.091) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Ancestor from WT -0.912∗∗∗ -0.867∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.134) (0.024) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020)
Ancestor from abroad 1.033 1.284 0.150 0.077 0.099 0.147
(0.948) (0.862) (0.134) (0.128) (0.177) (0.157)
Grandparent 0.346∗∗ 0.289∗ 0.025 0.022 0.033 0.017
(0.159) (0.160) (0.025) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022)
Great-grandparent 1.040∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.228) (0.231) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037)
Ancestor from rural area -0.508∗∗∗ -0.524∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.094) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Controls‡ X X X X X X
County FE X X X
Municipality FE X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 13.04 13.04 0.55 0.55 0.26 0.26
R2 0.29 0.37 0.21 0.30 0.22 0.29
Observations 11,548 11,548 11,548 11,548 11,548 11,548
Notes: The table reports the effect of forced migration (ancestors from Kresy) on education, using the data from our
2016 Ancestry Survey at the ancestor level, as given by specification (2). Standard errors are clustered by individual
respondents. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for respondents
living in rural locations and urban counties. Excluded category is ancestors from Central Poland.
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Table 8: Main Results for Kresy Migrants from Rural vs. Urban Areas, and from Ukraine Only
Dependent variable: Years of education in 2016, at the respondent level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
“Ancestors from Kresy” includes: All Kresy Ancestors Only Kresy Ancestors from Ukraine
Notes on sample: Ancestor location: Ancestor & descendant: Ancestor location:
all urban rural urban rural all urban rural
Ancestor from Kresy 0.503∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.312∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.160) (0.110) (0.173) (0.184) (0.111) (0.182) (0.132)
Ancestor from rural area -0.508∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.106)
Controls‡ X X X X X X X X
County FE X X X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 13.04 13.64 12.84 13.87 11.83 12.98 13.52 12.80
R2 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.28 0.31 0.32
Observations 11,548 2,950 8,598 2,417 3,084 10,237 2,568 7,669
Notes: The table uses data from our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the Western Territories, showing that the coefficient on
Kresy ancestors is, if anything, larger for ancestors from urban areas (where expulsion from Kresy was complete), and
that the coefficient is robust to using only the Ukrainian part of Kresy, where expulsions were also nearly complete,
leaving essentially no scope for selection at the origin locations. Regressions are run at the ancestor level; standard
errors clustered by individual respondents. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, indicators for respondents living in ru-
ral locations and urban counties, as well as indicators for the ancestor generation (grandparents and great-grandparents,
with parents being the excluded category), and for ancestors from rural areas, Western Territories, and abroad. Ex-
cluded category is ancestors from Central Poland.
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Table 9: Education Today and Historically in Counties of Origin of Ancestors
Dependent variable: as indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Secondary Edu Historical Secondary Edu Historical Secondary Edu Historical
in 2016 Literacy in 2016 Literacy in 2016 Literacy
Sample. Ancestor from: Rural & Urban origin Rural origin Urban origin
Panel A: Literacy from the 1921 Polish Census
Ancestor from Kresy 0.073∗∗∗ -0.031∗ 0.060∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.025) (0.023)
Ancestor from rural area -0.069∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.012)
Controls‡ X X X X X X
County FE X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.57 0.62 0.54 0.58 0.66 0.75
R2 0.21 0.37 0.24 0.11 0.26 0.21
Observations 9,645 9,645 7,161 7,161 2,484 2,484
Panel B: Literacy from the 1897 Russian Census
Ancestor from Kresy 0.139∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗ 0.137∗∗ -0.030∗∗
(0.030) (0.014) (0.034) (0.014) (0.069) (0.014)
Ancestor from rural area -0.040 0.003
(0.033) (0.005)
Controls‡ X X X X X X
County FE X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.58 0.16 0.57 0.16 0.63 0.15
R2 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.58 0.53
Observations 2,177 2,177 1,744 1,744 433 433
Notes: The table shows that descendants of Kresy migrants have significantly higher rates of secondary education
today (odd columns), while their ancestors came – on average – from counties with lower literacy (even columns):
The coefficient on Kresy in even columns reflects the average difference in historical literacy rates between counties
in Kresy and in Central Poland from which respondents’ ancestors originated. Regressions are run at the ancestor
level, using data from our Ancestry Survey. Standard errors clustered by individual respondents in odd columns and
using two-way clustering by individual respondents and by county of origin in even columns. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, indicators for respondents living in
rural locations and urban counties, and an indicator for ancestors from the Western Territories. Excluded category is
ancestors from Central Poland.
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Table 10: Education Difference Between Destination and Origin of Migrants from CP to WT
Dep. Var.: Difference in education, variable indicated in table header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: Secondary Higher Secondary Higher Secondary Higher
Education Education Education Education Education Education
Sample: Urban & Rural Urban origin Rural origin
& destination & destination
∆Edu(i) 0.027∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.012 0.041 -0.028 -0.005
(0.014) (0.011) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.016)
Observations 1,391 1,391 323 323 347 347
Notes: The table combines data from our Ancestry Survey with Diagnoza data. The table provides the results from
estimating equation (3). This addresses the possibility of individual selection of voluntary migrants from Central
Poland to the Western Territories (which would affect the composition of the control group in our Ancestry Survey
results). The table shows that respondents in WT who are descendants of migrants from Central Poland are, if anything,
slightly better educated than a reasonable comparison group – people who still live in the places of their ancestors’
origin in Central Poland. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 11: Other Potential Channels:
Congestion, Returns to Schooling, Out-Migration, Differential Fertility
Dep. Var.: as indicated in table header. Data from Diagnoza.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Analysis: Congestion? Return to Schooling? Out-Migration? Fertility?
Dep. Var.: Years of Education log(HH income) Intend to go abroad Share Children in HH
Sample WT WT all WT all all all # children ≥ 1
Ancestor from Kresy 0.761∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.067 0.013 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.004
(0.079) (0.083) (0.044) (0.050) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
% Polish speakers, 1900 (std) 0.287∗∗∗
(0.069)
% Polish sp (std) × Kresy 0.102
(0.074)
Share Autochthons, 1950 (std) 0.202∗∗
(0.079)
Sh Autochthons (std) × Kresy 0.133
(0.094)
Years education (std) 0.211∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.013) (0.024) (0.002)
Years edu (std) × Kresy -0.025 0.014 0.001
(0.030) (0.041) (0.005)
Controls‡ X X X X X X X X
Region FE X X
County FE X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 11.65 11.65 8.46 8.40 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.33
R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.26 0.24
Observations 7,307 7,307 15,932 3,875 22,096 22,066 29,105 10,126
Notes: The table examines four alternative mechanisms that may explain the education advantage of people with Kresy
ancestors: congestion due to the presence of autochthons (columns 1-2); differential returns to education (columns 3-
4); differential out-migration (columns 5-6); and differential fertility (cols 7-8). None of these appear to confound the
coefficient on Kresy. Regressions are run at the level of respondents in Diagnoza; standard errors clustered by powiat.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for Western
Territories, rural places, and urban counties.
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I Background
Forced Kresy migrants just before leaving Kresy and upon arrival to WT
Figures A.1 and A.2 presented below exhibit the images of forced Kresy migrants right before
leaving Kresy and right after arriving to the Western Territories. The online exhibition of the
Polish History Museum devoted to forced migrants provides the following testimony as a caption
to the image in the first figure: “And so it happened that ... the marshall came: ‘Leave’ — ‘But
where should I go?’— ‘To Poland.’ And I say: ‘I am in Poland.’ And he says: ‘This is not Poland
anymore.’ ”1
Figure A.1: Forced Kresy Migrants before their Departure from Kresy, Hłyboka (Ukraine), 1946.
Source: The collection of Polish History Museum.
1Edward Jaremko (cited by S. Ciesielski, Exit. Kresy Wschodnie – Ziemie Zachodnie), online exhibit
https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/mwLihxsZye49Lw?hl=pl (Accessed on May 17, 2018).
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Figure A.2: Forced Migrants from Kresy with their Belongings Arriving to Bielawa, former Lan-
genbielau (a locality in the Western Territories), 1946.
Source: Figure 29 in Zaremba (2012).
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Promotional poster for voluntary migrants from Central Poland to the Western Territories
Figure A.3 displays a typical example of posters that were used by the authorities in Central Poland
to entice voluntary migration to the Western Territories.
Figure A.3: Advertising to Attract Migrants from Central Poland to the Western Territories
Note: The poster’s title reads “The land is waiting.” The text below the picture reads: “The State Repatriation Of-
fice is assigning farms in Opole and Lower Silesia. The regional inspectorates [offices] will provide all necessary
information.”
The timing of mass migrations from Kresy and Central Poland
Figure A.4 illustrates that forced migrants from Kresy and voluntary migrants from Central Poland
arrived in the Western Territories (WT) at the same time. Panel A shows data on the stock of
migrants who had arrived in WT by month, during the first two years of mass migration. The data
start in December 1945 and show that by then, 1.5m migrants had moved into WT. That stock
continued to grow steadily, reaching more than 4m migrants by the end of 1947. Panel B displays
the share of Kresy migrants in that stock over time, separately for urban and rural destinations.
Kresy migrants accounted for 40-50% of all migrants throughout this two-year window, in both
urban and rural destinations. This suggests that Kresy migrants and ‘re-settlers’ from CP (the
official label used by the Polish authorities) arrived in parallel throughout the whole period. Thus, a
potential concern that CP migrants moved into WT more quickly, generating a potential congestion
effect for Kresy migrants, is not warranted.
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Figure A.4: The Timing of Arrival of Migrants to the Western Territories
Note: The registry of migrants accounts for re-settlers from Central Poland and forced migrants from Kresy. The
data come from the Document of the Ministry of Recovered Territories, No. 1661 (The Central Archives of Modern
Records in Warsaw).
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Places of origin of ancestors
Figure A.5: Origin of Ancestors in our Ancestry Survey.
Note: The figure displays the origin of ancestors in our Ancestry Survey. The different dot sizes indicate the number
of ancestors from each respective location. The different areas on the map are described in the note to Figure 1 in the
paper: In the east, the former eastern Polish territories (Kresy); in the west, the Western Territories, and in the center,
Central Poland.
II Summary Statistics
Summary statistics
Tables A.1 and A.2 present summary statistics for the main explanatory and dependent variables.
Table A.1 describes variables measuring the origin of ancestors in both surveys. In the Diagnoza
survey, 11.3% of respondents have at least one ancestor from Kresy; as one should expect, the share
of respondents with Kresy origin is higher in Western Territories (27.2%) than in Central Poland
(6.0%). In our Ancestry Survey, in the representative sample of the WT population (i.e., excluding
the oversample of respondents with Kresy origin mentioned in Section 3.1), 31.3% of respondents
have at least one ancestor from Kresy in the generation of the youngest adult in 1939. The mean
share of ancestors from Kresy is 23.6%, from Western Territories –15.9%, from Central Poland
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– 60.5%, and from abroad – 1.3%. The mean share of ancestors from rural areas is 75.7%. The
third panel of the table presents summary statistics at the respondent level for the whole sample of
the Ancestry Survey, including the oversample of respondents with Kresy origin. The last panel
in Table A.1 summarizes data at the ancestor level for the whole sample of the Ancestry Survey.
About 23% of the ancestors are from the parent generation, 55% from the grandparent generation,
and 22% from the great-grandparent generation.
Table A.2 below presents summary statistics for the variables we use to measure education in
both surveys. Note that in our Ancestry Survey, there is no question on the years of education (see
also footnote 41 in the paper). We infer this information from the answer to the questions about
the educational degrees. We consider four categories: primary education, incomplete secondary
education, completed secondary education, and higher education. Information necessary to con-
struct these variables is present in both Diagnoza and our Ancestry Survey. We impute the years
of education in the Ancestry Survey by using the average years of education for each of the four
education categories in Diagnoza, rounded to the nearest integer.
III Migration Flows Implied by Survey Data vs. Historical Census
Diagnoza survey vs. 1950 Census
In this section, we check the quality of the ancestry data from our surveys against migration flows
implied by the 1950 Polish Census. The Diagnoza Survey and the 1950 Census cover all of the
Polish post-WWII territory. The data in the 1950 Census is available at the regional (voivodeships)
level, providing information on where respondents lived in 1939 and in 1950. This allows us to
construct migration flows. We begin with migrants from Kresy (who Migrants indicated “USSR”
as their place of residence in 1939). Figure A.6 compares the results of the Diagnoza survey with
the 1950 Census. The left panel displays the share people (in each region) in 1950 who had lived
in Kresy in 1939, plotted against the share of respondents with ancestors from Kresy in the 2015
Diagnoza Survey. The historical and contemporaneous shares line up very well for most regions.2
For population in the Western Territories, the 1950 Census provides information at the more
disaggregated level of counties (powiaty). We can thus compute the share of Kresy migrants in
each WT county in 1950. We use this information to repeat the consistency check on the Diagnoza
data in the right panel of Figure A.6. The fit in this county-level exercise is bound to be less
precise for two reasons. First, the post-1950 mobility across county boundaries is higher than
across regional boundaries. Second, in the Diagnoza Survey, the number of respondents in some
counties is quite small, so that measuring the share of respondents with Kresy origin becomes
noisier. Despite these caveats, the right panel of Figure A.6 shows a tight relationship.
Ancestry survey vs. 1950 Census
Figure A.7 repeats the above exercise using our 2016 Ancestry Survey in combination with the
1950 Census. Recall that our Ancestry Survey was conducted only in the Western Territories. Cor-
2There are a few exceptions. For instance, Warszawa (the Masovian Voivodeship) is considerably below the regres-
sion line. This means that, while in 1950 few people of Kresy origin lived there because the majority moved straight
to the Western Territories, in 2015 the share of Warsaw survey respondents with Kresy ancestors is considerably larg-
er. This is likely driven by the capital city’s attraction of educated people – among them the descendants of Kresy
migrants.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Variables Describing the Origin of Ancestors
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Diagnoza: Poland, full sample
(Any) Ancestor from Kresy 29,392 0.113 0.317 0 1
Diagnoza: Western Territories
(Any) Ancestor from Kresy 7,389 0.272 0.445 0 1
Diagnoza: Central Poland
(Any) Ancestor from Kresy 22,003 0.060 0.237 0 1
Ancestry Survey: Respondent level, representative sample
(Any) Ancestor from Kresy 2,846 0.313 0.464 0 1
Share of ancestors from Kresy 2,846 0.236 0.381 0 1
Share of ancestors from CP 2,846 0.605 0.441 0 1
Share of ancestors from WT 2,846 0.159 0.341 0 1
Share of ancestors from rural areas 2,811 0.757 0.377 0 1
Share of ancestors from abroad 2,843 0.013 0.078 0 1
Ancestry Survey: Respondent level, whole sample
(Any) Ancestor from Kresy 3,716 0.463 0.499 0 1
Share of ancestors from Kresy 3,716 0.367 0.434 0 1
Share of ancestors from CP 3,716 0.501 0.449 0 1
Share of ancestors from WT 3,716 0.131 0.312 0 1
Share of ancestors from rural areas 3,671 0.735 0.391 0 1
Share of ancestors from abroad 3,712 0.012 0.074 0 1
Ancestry Survey: Ancestor level, whole sample
Ancestor from Kresy 11,928 0.324 0.468 0 1
Ancestor from CP 11,928 0.516 0.5 0 1
Ancestor from WT 11,928 0.160 0.367 0 1
Ancestor from rural area 11,548 0.745 0.436 0 1
Ancestor female 11,928 0.497 0.382 0 1
Parent 11,928 0.229 0.420 0 1
Grandparent 11,928 0.547 0.498 0 1
Great-grandparent 11,928 0.225 0.417 0 1
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for ancestry variables in Diagnoza from 2015
and our Ancestry Survey from 2016. In both surveys, we consider the samples of individ-
uals with non-missing information about Kresy origin. For Diagnoza, we further restrict
the sample to respondents with non-missing information about educational attainment,
which is known for all respondents in the Ancestry Survey.
respondingly, we use the available county-level data from the 1950 Census for WT. Our Ancestry
Survey asks about origin locations of all ancestors, including those ancestors who came to WT
from Central Poland (and not only from Kresy, as in Diagnoza). The 1950 Census, in turn, pro-
vides information on overall 16 origin areas (i.e., areas of residence in 1939). These include Kresy,
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Education Variables
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Diagnoza
Education years 29,348 11.720 3.366 0 28
Secondary education 29,289 0.480 0.500 0 1
Higher education 29,289 0.195 0.396 0 1
Ancestry Survey: Respondent level, representative sample
Education years 2,846 12.595 3.222 7 17
Secondary education 2,846 0.491 0.500 0 1
Higher education 2,846 0.220 0.415 0 1
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for education variables in Diag-
noza 2015 and our Ancestry Survey 2016.
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Figure A.6: Data Quality Check of Diagnoza Survey
Note: The left panel plots the regional share of migrants from Kresy territories in the 1950 Census (y-axis) against
the Kresy migrant share from the 2015 Diagnoza data. The variation is at the region level (voivodeship). Data are
available for 24 regions, covering all of Poland (with separate observations for the parts of regions that were split by
the border of the Western Territories). The regression coefficient is 1.00 with a standard error of 0.057 and R2 of
0.73. The right panel of the figure plots the county (powiaty) level share of migrants from Kresy territories in the 1950
Census (y-axis) against the Kresy migrant share from the 2015 Diagnoza data. These more detailed data are available
for 107 counties in the Western Territories of Poland. The regression coefficient is 0.39 with a standard error of 0.071
and R2 of 0.26.
the Western Territories, and 14 regions in Central Poland. We thus compute, for each county in
WT, the share of migrants from each of these 16 origin areas in 1950. We then map the origin
location data from the Ancestry Survey to the same 16 origin areas. The left panel of Figure A.7
plots the county-level origin shares from the 1950 Census against those from our Ancestry Survey.
The right panel restricts attention to migrants from Kresy, plotting the share of people of Kresy
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origin by county from our Ancestry Survey against the same share from the 1950 Census. Both
panels show a strong positive relationship between the data in the two data sources, supporting
the reliability of our Ancestry Survey. In sum, the benchmarking exercises make us confident that
respondents in the Diagnoza Survey and in the Ancestry Survey gave reasonable answers to the
questions about their ancestral places of origin.
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Figure A.7: Data Quality Check of our Ancestry Survey – WT Only
Note: The left panel plots the county (powiaty) level share of migrants from 16 origin territories in the 1950 Census
(y-axis) against the migrant share from the 2016 Ancestry Survey. The 16 origin territories include Kresy, Western
Territories, and 14 regions of pre-WWII Poland. The regression coefficient is 0.69 with a standard error of 0.04 and
R2 of 0.59. The right panel repeats this exercise, but using only migrants from Kresy. The regression coefficient is
0.38 with a standard error of 0.09 and R2 of 0.19.
IV Monte Carlo Simulations
In Section 5.2, we present the results of regressions estimated at the ancestor level. It is important
to understand how the ancestor level results compare to the estimations at the respondent level.
We run a series of Monte Carlo simulations to compare both the point estimates and the level of
significance for the following two equations:
Respondent-level: Yi = β Kresyi + φ′ Xi + ηLocality(i) + εi, (A.1)
Ancestor-level: Yi = γKresya(i) + ψ
′Aa(i) + φ′Xi + ηLocality(i) + εa(i) (A.2)
Note that, in line with our specifications (1) and (2) in the paper, in the first equation above,Kresyi
is respondent i’s share of ancestors from Kresy; and in the second equation, Kresya(i) is a dummy
that equals one if ancestor a of respondent i came from Kresy. In addition, we cluster the error
term in the second equation at the respondent level.
The Monte Carlo Simulations yield the following results: Econometrically, the respondent-
level and ancestor-level regressions are not equivalent. The estimated parameters β and γ, in gen-
eral, are not equal; yet, the statistical inference, i.e., the significance of these parameter estimates,
is similar.
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First, we find that the parameters β and γ are equal only in the case when dummies for Kresy
origin of different ancestors of the same respondent are perfectly correlated for all respondents.
Formally, this means that for each respondent i, the indicators for Kresy origin of all ancestors
of this respondent i in the generation of the youngest adults before the war are the same (i.e.,
Kresym(i) = Kresyf(i) , where m and f are ancestors drawn at random from the full set of ances-
tors of respondent i in the considered generation, and this holds for all i).3
The parameter γ depends on the correlation between the indicators of Kresy origin of ancestors
of the same respondent. The lower the correlation, the lower is γ (however, it is bounded below).
If that correlation is zero, the parameter γ of the ancestor-level regressions is equal to the effect
of the share of ancestors with Kresy origin of the respondent-level regressions (β), divided by the
average number of ancestors per respondent (N ), i.e., γ = β/N . More formally, the condition for
equality of γ and β is that indicator variables for Kresy origin of any ancestor a(i) are i.i.d.
The parameter γ is within the interval [β/N ; β] as long as the correlation between indicator
variables of Kresy origin of different ancestors of the same respondent is non-negative (i.e., if one
ancestor drawn at random from the pool of all ancestors of all respondents has a Kresy origin, the
other ancestor drawn at random from the set of ancestors of the same respondent is more likely to
also be of Kresy origin than an ancestor drawn at random from the whole pool of all ancestors of
all respondents).
In reality, the origins are positively correlated across ancestors of the same respondent, but this
correlation is strictly below one, which means that we should expect smaller point estimates in the
ancestor level regressions than in the respondent level regressions. In particular, the correlation
between the dummies indicating the Kresy origin of spouses (e.g., of the mother and father or
of the paternal grandmother and paternal grandfather of the same respondent) is over 90%. The
correlation between dummies for Kresy origin of grandparents from the mother’s and father’s side,
e.g., of the fathers of the parents of the respondent, is over 30%; and the correlation between the
origins of the most distant ancestors, i.e. different great-grandparents, is 7%.
Second, the Monte Carlo simulations show that the level of statistical significance is similar
between the respondent-level regressions and the ancestor-level regressions, when we cluster error
terms at the respondent level. The level of significance is comparable irrespective of the level of
correlation between the origins of different ancestors of the same respondent. Namely, when γ is
below β, the standard errors are also proportionally smaller in the ancestor-level estimation, and
therefore, statistical inference is similar.
Third, both of these facts are true not only for the estimation of the direct effects of Kresy
ancestry (γ vs β), but also for the heterogeneity in the effects. In particular, when we consider an
interaction term between the Kresy ancestor variables (share or dummy in the respondent-level and
ancestor-level regression, respectively) and a characteristic of the place of origin of respondents
ancestors (which is averaged across ancestors in the respondent-level regressions), we find that the
statistical inference is similar in both cases. This is particularly important because in Section 6.4
of the main text, we show that the interactions between the characteristics of the origin locations
and the dummy for Kresy origin of the respondent’s ancestor are statistically insignificant.
3If the considered generation of ancestors is parents, m and f are simply mother and father; if grandparents, these
are two grandparents randomly drawn from the pool of all grandparents of the respondent i, etc.
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To sum up, our Monte Carlo simulations show that t-statistics for the coefficients in the ancestor-
level regressions and in the corresponding t-statistics in the respondent-level regressions are very
similar, suggesting that our statistical inference is correct.
V Additional Evidence for the Main Result
In this section, we present additional evidence in support of our main result.
Results from Diagnoza with municipality FEs
Table A.3 replicates columns 1 to 5 from Table 2 from the paper with controls for municipality
fixed effects instead of county fixed effects. The coefficient sizes are almost identical, suggesting
that local unobservables do not confound our results.4
4Note that controlling for municipality FEs is a very restrictive specification in Diagnoza because there are very
few respondents in smaller municipalities. As a consequence, often there is no variation in Kresy ancestry within a
given small municipality (e.g., two out of two respondents having no Kresy ancestors). Thus, the coefficient on Kresy
in Table A.3 is identified mostly from larger municipalities with many respondents.
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Table A.3: Average Education of Individuals in the 2015 Diagnoza Survey
Dependent variable: Individual-Level Education, as indicated in each panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: All Rural Urban Central Western
Poland Territories
Panel A. Dep. Var.: Years of education
Ancestor from Kresy 0.903∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.142) (0.103) (0.127) (0.112)
Mean Dep. Var. 11.95 11.12 12.78 11.98 11.88
Observations 25,702 12,805 12,897 19,248 6,454
Panel B. Dep. Var.: Secondary education dummy
Ancestor from Kresy 0.125∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.024) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.51 0.38 0.64 0.51 0.51
Observations 25,703 12,808 12,895 19,242 6,461
Panel C. Dep. Var.: Higher education dummy
Ancestor from Kresy 0.101∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.21 0.13 0.30 0.21 0.21
Observations 25,703 12,808 12,895 19,242 6,461
Respondent municipality FE X X X X X
Controls‡ X X X X X
Notes: The table replicates Table 2, columns 2-6, from the paper, using municipality fixed effects instead of county
fixed effects. Data are from the Diagnoza Survey; standard errors clustered a the household level * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for Western
Territories, rural places and urban counties.
Appendix p.12
Border analysis in our Ancestry Survey – additional results
The results shown in this subsection complement our border analysis from Section 5.2 in the paper.
Figure A.8 illustrates the border sample based on our Ancestry Survey data. It shows the locations
of origin places for ancestors for those ancestors who came from within 150 kilometers from the
Kresy border.
Figure A.8: Origin of Ancestors in our Ancestry Survey.
Note: The figure displays the origin of ancestors in the border sample of our Ancestry Survey – within 150km of the
Kresy border. The different dot sizes indicate the number of ancestors from each respective location. The different
areas on the map are described in the note to Figure 1 in the paper: In the east, the former eastern Polish territories
(Kresy); in the west, the Western Territories, and in the center, Central Poland.
Table A.4 complements the graphical evidence from Figure 4 of the main text. The table
presents the results of our most demanding specifications: We identify the effect of ancestors’
origin for individuals living within the same county (column 1) or even within the same munici-
pality (columns 2 to 5) whose ancestors originate from localities close to the Kresy border using a
spatial dimensional RDD that controls for a quadratic polynomials in latitude and longitude of the
ancestor’s origin. We estimate several specifications to illustrate the robustness of the main result
displayed in Figure 4. In columns 1 to 3 of Table A.4, we use years of education as outcome vari-
able and show that the results are robust to using samples within 150 and 100km from the Kresy
border. In columns 4 and 5, we report the results for secondary and higher education dummies,
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respectively. Results of all specifications are consistently strong and of similar magnitude as our
main results for the Ancestry Survey in Table 6 in the paper.
Table A.4: Education in the Western Territories: Ancestors Originating Near Kresy Border
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Years of education Secondary Higher
Notes on sample: < 150km < 150km < 100km < 150km < 150km
Ancestor from Kresy 0.678∗ 0.948∗∗ 1.344∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(0.354) (0.390) (0.523) (0.058) (0.055)
Controls‡ X X X X X
County FE X
Municipality FE X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.72 12.72 12.66 0.54 0.24
R2 0.30 0.43 0.53 0.41 0.36
Observations 3,291 3,291 1,949 3,291 3,291
Notes: The table uses data from our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the Western Territories, using only ancestors from within
the indicated distance from the Kresy border. Regressions are run at the ancestor level; robust standard errors clustered
at the respondent level indicated in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural places
and urban counties, an indicator for the generation of the ancestor, rural location of the ancestor. All columns control
for a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude of ancestors’ location of origin.
VI Additional Results on Potential Alternative Mechanisms
Table A.5 below presents data from the 1921 Polish Census, separately for Kresy and Central
Poland. It shows that, on average, literacy rates among Roman Catholics were lower in Kresy than
in Central Poland before WWII and that this difference was more pronounced in rural areas than
in urban areas.
Table A.5: Literacy rates of Poles in Kresy and Central Poland parts of the SPR
1921 Polish Census: Kresy Central Poland
Share of literate Roman Catholics, total 58.9 65.4
Share of literate Roman Catholics, urban 73.6 74.1
Share of literate Roman Catholics, rural 55.4 63.2
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Kresy migrants with destination in the Western Territories vs. Central Poland
Table A.6 restricts the Diagnoza sample to respondents with Kresy ancestors. It compares their
education in the Western Territories and in Central Poland. Odd columns in Table A.6 show the raw
differences (after controlling for individual characteristics). Note that we cannot control for local
fixed effects in these specifications because the table compares individuals with Kresy ancestors
across regions. Thus, differences in local labor markets affect the results. To account for at least
some of this variation, even columns include an indicator for individuals who live in the counties
(powiaty) of Warsaw or Krakow – the main university centers in Poland. The results imply that
controlling for these educational centers is important, as it reduces the difference between WT and
CP. We find that – after accounting for Warsaw and Krakow – respondents with Kresy ancestors
who live in the Western Territories have, on average, 0.44 fewer years of education and are 5.0
and 6.0 percentage points less likely to complete secondary and higher education, respectively, as
compared to respondents with Kresy ancestors who live in Central Poland.5 Thus, our Ancestry
Survey results in the Western Territories – which show a significant education advantage of people
with Kresy ancestors – are, if anything, underestimating the effect for Poland overall.
Table A.6: Education of Kresy Migrants in the Western Territories and Central Poland
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: Years of education Secondary education Higher education
Dummy for Western Territories -0.652∗∗∗ -0.436∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.136) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Warsaw or Krakow 2.225∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.349) (0.033) (0.044)
Controls‡ X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 12.58 12.58 0.61 0.61 0.29 0.29
R-squared 0.33 0.34 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.20
Observations 3,298 3,298 3,294 3,294 3,294 3,294
Notes: Regressions are run at the respondent level, restricting the sample to individuals with ancestors from Kresy in
the Diagnoza Survey. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. ‘Warsaw
or Krakow’ is an indicator that takes on value one for the counties (powiat) of Warsaw and Krakow.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural places
and urban counties.
Congestion
Figure A.9 illustrates that the county-level share of autochthons in the 1950 Polish Census is high-
ly correlated with the share of Polish speakers in the German Census of 1900. The 1900 German
Empire Census was the last census in the German Empire that collected information on language
5Note that the counties Warsaw and Krakow are geographically smaller than commuting zones. When we account
for larger areas – by using indicators for the Voivodeships of Mazowieckie and Lesser Poland (Małopolska), i.e., the
areas around Warsaw and Krakow – the coefficients on Western Territories become even smaller.
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spoken at home. Autochthons in the 1950 Polish Census are the people who had lived in the ter-
ritories that Germany lost to Poland as a result of WWII and were not expelled, as they declared
themselves to be Polish. Figure A.9 illustrates that autochthons are indeed largely people with eth-
nic Polish ancestry. They had German nationality in German censuses of the inter-war period, but
were no longer separately identified in German statistics until the Polish Census of 1950 counted
them as autochthons.
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Figure A.9: Two Alternative Measures of the Share of Autochthons across WT Counties
Note: The figure plots the share of Polish speakers in the German Empire Census in 1900 against the share of au-
tochthons in the 1950 Polish Census. The line shows a linear regression with coefficient of 0.83 and a standard error
of 0.07; the R2 is 0.57.
Out-migration
Figure A.10 plots the self-declared intention to emigrate of Diagnoza respondents in 2015 (col-
lapsed to the region level) against the share of people who actually emigrated from the same re-
gions according to the 2011 Polish Census. The latter data are available at the region (voivodeship)
level. The high correlation shown in the figure suggests that intention to emigrate measures some-
thing meaningful, as in previous years the same regions indeed saw larger realized emigration.6
It supports the validity of the evidence presented in Table 11 in the paper, which shows that the
intention to emigrate does not differ for those with Kresy ancestors.
6A linear regression yields a coefficient of 0.65 with a standard error of 0.18 and an R2 of 0.53.
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Figure A.10: Stated Intent to Emigrate vs. Emigration Rates
Note: The figure plots the share of respondents who intend to emigrate (Diagnoza 2015) against the share of people
who emigrated (from the 2011 Polish Census) at the regional (voivodeship) level. The figure also displays a 45-degree
line.
Moving as communities
Table A.7 investigates whether migrants from Kresy tended to move more (or less) together with
people from their origin location, as compared to migrants from Central Poland. We compute, for
each municipality in WT, the number of ancestors in our Ancestry Survey who are from the same
county of origin. We refer to this measure as the ‘size of the local ancestor community.’ This is
likely to be a noisy measure, as it is based on a count within our survey alone. Note also that this
number will mechanically tend to be larger in municipalities for which we have a higher number
of ancestors in our sample. We thus control – for each municipality – for the total ancestors in the
sample.
Table A.7 checks whether the size of local ancestor community is related to the Kresy origin of
migrants, and whether our results are robust to controlling for this measure. Column 1 shows that
there is no relationship between Kresy origin and the size of local ancestor communities. In other
words, Kresy migrants are not more (or less) likely to live in municipalities with many migrants
from the same origin. In column 2, we show that our main result from specification (2) also holds
in the subsample for which we can construct the size of the local ancestor community.7 In column
7The smaller sample is explained by two factors: First, to construct the size of the local ancestor community, we
can only use data from our representative sample in the Ancestry Survey (see Section 3.1 and in particular footnote
23 in the paper). We need to exclude the oversample of people with Kresy ancestors to avoid that the community size
from Kresy is overestimated. Second, we only compute the size of the local ancestor community for migrants from
Kresy and Central Poland. We exclude ancestors from WT because these are autochthons, while the focus here is on
migrant communities. In addition, we exclude ancestors from abroad because the community variable is undefined for
them.
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3, we use the size of the local ancestor community as a control, showing that the relationship
between Kresy origin and educational attainment is essentially unchanged. Finally, columns 4 and
5 show that our results for secondary and higher education are also robust to controlling for the
size of the local ancestor community. Overall, Table A.7 suggests that our results are unlikely to
be driven by variation in the size of the local community of people with common origin.
Table A.7: Size of Ancestor Communities in each Municipality: Ancestor-Level Data
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Size of local Years of education Secondary Higher
ancestor community# education education
Ancestor from Kresy -0.020 0.432∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.032∗
(0.260) (0.116) (0.115) (0.020) (0.017)
Size of ancestor community# -0.037∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.021) (0.003) (0.004)
Total ancestors in sample 0.010∗∗∗ -0.002∗ 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls‡ X X X X X
County FE X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 2.52 13.12 13.12 0.57 0.28
R2 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.22 0.24
Observations 7,093 7,093 7,093 7,093 7,093
Notes: The table uses data from our Ancestry Survey. Regressions are run at the ancestor level; robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural places
and urban counties.
# This variable is constructed for each municipality in our Ancestry Survey sample. It measures the total number of
ancestors who came from the same county of origin.
Recall bias: Missing information about ancestor origin locations
Table A.8 examines the role of missing information about ancestors in our 2016 Ancestry Survey in
the Western Territories. We compute the share of ancestors with missing information as follows for
each respondent: LetNa(i) be the number of ancestors for whom respondent i reported the location
of origin. Remember that our Ancestry Survey asked for information about the generation of
ancestors who were the youngest adults in the respondent’s family in 1939. For this generation, let
Nmax(i) denote the maximum possible number of ancestors (e.g., Nmax(i) = 4 for the grandparent
generation). Then, the share of i’s ancestors for whom information is missing is given by 1 −
Na(i)/Nmax(i).
Column 1 in Table A.8 shows that missing information on ancestors is unrelated to Kresy origin
in our baseline Ancestry Survey regression (which is run at the respondent level – see column 2,
Panel A, in Table 6 in the paper). More specifically, the excluded category in this regression is the
share of ancestors from Central Poland. Thus, the zero coefficient on the share of Kresy ancestors
means that respondents with ancestors from Kresy are just as likely as those with ancestors from
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Central Poland to remember their ancestors. This makes it unlikely that any of our results are
confounded by missing information on ancestors. Note also that the mean of the dependent variable
in column 1 is 0.12. That is, the share of ancestors with missing information is only 12% in
our Ancestry Survey. Finally, the coefficient on the share of ancestors from WT in column 1 is
negative and significant, meaning that respondents are more likely to remember the location of their
ancestors in the Western Territories. This is not surprising, given that our survey was conducted in
WT.
In the remaining columns in Table A.8, we use our education measures as outcome variables.
Column 2 shows that there is a significantly negative relationship between years of education and
the share of missing ancestor information. This is what one would expect: More educated respon-
dents tend to be better informed about their ancestors. Columns 3-5 replicate the specification
from columns 2, 5, and 6 in Panel A of Table 6 in the paper, adding the share of missing ancestor
information as an additional control. The coefficients on the share of Kresy ancestors are literal-
ly unchanged. Thus, missing information about ancestor origin locations does not confound our
results.
Heterogeneity in the effect depending on characteristics of origin locations
In Tables A.9 and A.10 we test for possible differential effects of Kresy origin depending on
characteristics at the ancestors’ place of origin. In particular, we run regressions at the ancestor
level, in which we include interactions between the dummy for Kresy ancestry and (standardized)
county-level characteristics of the place of origin of the ancestor, as well as characteristics of the
place of origin of the ancestor themselves.8
Table A.9 examines the heterogeneity with respect to various measures of diversity at the
origin location. In particular, we consider the following pre-WWII county level variables: the
share of Roman Catholics, the share of Polish speakers, the share of Ukrainian speakers, the
share of Russian speakers, the total literacy rate and the literacy rate among Roman Catholics,
as well as the urbanization rate. Table A.10 considers heterogeneity with respect to land suitability
for wheat (which was the main crop in pre-WWII Kresy), mean temperature, the precipitation-
evatranspiration ratio, and ruggedness of the origin locations. We find no differential effects of
Kresy origin on years of education with respect to any of these characteristics. This evidence
suggests that the effect of Kresy origin is driven by forced migration itself, rather than by the
characteristics of the origin of Kresy migrants.
8Since we use interaction terms with county-of-origin characteristics, we use two-way clustering both at the re-
spondent i level and at the level of ancestors’ county of origin.
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Table A.8: Accounting for Missing Ancestor Information in the Ancestry Survey
Dependent variable: as indicated in column header
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Share missing Years of education Secondary Higher
ancestor info† education education
Share of Ancestors, Kresy 0.000 0.812∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.139) (0.021) (0.018)
Share of Ancestors, WT -0.059∗∗∗ -1.079∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.195) (0.032) (0.024)
Share of Ancestors, abroad -0.126∗∗∗ -1.267 -0.032 -0.015
(0.038) (0.867) (0.113) (0.100)
Share of Ancestors, rural 0.001 -0.458∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗ -0.034∗
(0.011) (0.163) (0.024) (0.020)
Share missing ancestor info† -0.671∗∗ -0.865∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.285) (0.050) (0.040)
Controls‡ X X X X X
County FE X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 0.12 12.44 12.44 0.47 0.22
R2 0.21 0.27 0.29 0.21 0.21
Observations 3,581 3,581 3,581 3,581 3,581
Notes: The table examines the role of missing information about ancestors in our 2016 Ancestry Survey in the Western
Territories. Columns 3-5 replicate the specification from cols 2, 5, and 6 in Panel A of Table 6 in the paper, adding
the share of missing ancestor information as an additional control. Regressions are run at the respondent level; robust
standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
† For each respondent, the share of ancestors with missing information is computed specific to the generation of an-
cestors who were the youngest adults in the respondent’s family in 1939. For example, if those were the grandparents,
and the historical location for three out of four grandparent is known, then the share missing is 0.25.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural places
and urban counties, an indicator for the generation of the ancestor, and rural location of the ancestor.
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Table A.9: No Heterogeneous Effects with Respect to Ancestors’ Origin Characteristics
Dependent variable: Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ancestor from Kresy 0.542∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.141) (0.105) (0.105) (0.108) (0.096) (0.104) (0.098)
Share Rom. Cath., 1931 (std) 0.049
(0.114)
Rom. Cath., 1931 (std) × Kresy -0.042
(0.141)
Share Polish speakers, 1931 (std) 0.028
(0.136)
Polish speakers, 1931 (std) × Kresy -0.006
(0.167)
Share Ukrainian speakers, 1931 (std) -0.001
(0.124)
Ukrainian speakers, 1931 (std) × Kresy -0.077
(0.126)
Share Russian speakers, 1931 (std) 0.209
(0.212)
Russian speakers, 1931 (std) × Kresy -0.181
(0.213)
Literacy rate, 1931 (std) -0.027
(0.080)
Literacy rate, 1931 (std) × Kresy 0.045
(0.093)
Urbanization rate, 1931 (std) 0.047
(0.060)
Urbanization rate, 1931 (std) × Kresy -0.087
(0.058)
Literacy rate, 1921 (std) 0.005
(0.075)
Literacy rate, 1921 (std) × Kresy -0.007
(0.093)
Literacy rate Rom. Cath., 1921 (std) 0.015
(0.066)
Literacy rate Rom. Cath., 1921 (std) × Kresy 0.002
(0.085)
Controls‡ X X X X X X X X
County FE X X X X X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 13.14 13.14 13.14 13.14 13.14 13.15 13.14 13.14
R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Observations 9,706 9,706 9,706 9,706 9,667 8,613 9,645 9,645
Notes: The table uses data from our Ancestry Survey. Regressions are run at the ancestor level. The table shows that
the coefficient on Kresy ancestry does not vary significantly with average characteristics of the population at the place
of origin. Standard errors clustered using two-way clustering by individual respondents and by county of origin. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural places
and urban counties.
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Table A.10: No Heterogeneous Effects w.r.t. Geographic Features at Ancestors’ Origin
Dependent variable: Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ancestor from Kresy 0.589∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.117) (0.103) (0.096)
Land suitability for wheat at origin (std) -0.041
(0.082)
Land suit. for wheat (std) × Kresy 0.014
(0.096)
Annual temperature at origin (std) 0.030
(0.089)
Annual temperature (std) × Kresy -0.169
(0.115)
Precip.-evatranspiration ration at origin (std) -0.015
(0.064)
Precip.-evatranspiration ration (std) × Kresy -0.052
(0.099)
Ruggedness at origin (std) 0.034
(0.048)
Ruggedness (std) × Kresy -0.088
(0.082)
Controls‡ X X X X
County FE X X X X
Mean Dep. Var. 13.15 13.15 13.15 13.15
R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Observations 8,793 8,793 8,793 8,793
Notes: The table uses data from our Ancestry Survey. Regressions are run at the ancestor level. The table shows that
the coefficient on Kresy ancestry does not vary systematically with geographic characteristics at the place of origin.
Standard errors clustered using two-way clustering by individual respondents and by county of origin. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
‡ Controls include respondents’ gender, age, age2, dummies for six age groups, as well as indicators for rural places
and urban counties.
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